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### 1NC—K

#### Death and misfortune are inevitable – the joy of life comes in accepting things as they are – plans to save the world only bring more suffering

Slabbert 1 [Jos, Taoist teacher and philosopher, “Tao te Ching: How to Deal with Suffering” http://www.taoism.net/theway/suffer.htm]

Dealing with loss Express yourself completely, then keep quiet. Be like the forces of nature: when it blows, there is only wind; when it rains, there is only rain; when the clouds pass, the sun shines through. If you open yourself to the Tao, you are at one with the Tao and you can embody it completely. If you open yourself to insight, you are at one with insight and you can use it completely. If you open yourself to loss, you are at one with loss and you can accept it completely. Open yourself to the Tao, then trust your natural responses; and everything will fall into place. (Chapter 23) The word "open" is repeated often in this poem. Most people think the only way to handle suffering is to withdraw and to close yourself. The poet is clearly saying in this poem that the opposite is true: If you open yourself to loss, you are at one with loss and you can accept it completely. This openness, a willingness and courage to face reality, is the only way to deal with suffering, particularly inescapable suffering. But the openness the poet is describing is more than just facing reality. It is facing reality in total harmony with the Tao: If you open yourself to the Tao, you are at one with the Tao and you can embody it completely. It is only when you "embody" the Tao that you can face suffering with true equanimity. You will then have the openness that insight into your own nature and the natural way of Tao brings you. The right approach to suffering is only possible when you have reduced your ego to a minimum. The less ego you have, the less you suffer. Facing death with unresolved agendas is a terrible form of suffering. You will have to let go of selfish interests and futile aims to concentrate on dealing with the moment. It is the acceptance of the inevitable that makes suffering bearable. On his death bed, his family mourning, he is serene, for he knows Death, like Life, is an illusion: there is no beginning and no end. There is only the endless flow of Tao. The man of Tao has no fear, for he walks with Tao. (The Tao is Tao, 154) Agendas A good traveler has no fixed plans and is not intent upon arriving. (Chapter 27) Plans, aims, objectives and agendas have become the routes of suffering for so many people, and not only the ambitious. Agendas often take spontaneity and joy out of life. In the process, many people have become bad travelers, concentrating only on their objectives, and arriving at their destinations only to find that even their destinations are not really worth the trouble. Having no fixed plans? This does not sound like survival in a modern technological environment, does it? I mean, who but the extremely fortunate have the luxury of not having agendas running their lives? In most cases, one could justifiably point out, agendas are forced on you by your professional and familial obligations. You do not really have a choice, do you? How could one then become a good traveler through life in this modern world? I think the key lies in the second line of the quotation. One should not be "intent upon arriving". You should adopt an attitude of detachment. The moment your aims become egocentric, your suffering increases. The less your own ego is involved, the less seriously you will take life, and the more you will enjoy the journey. It is easier said than done, though, particularly when the job you are doing seems to be devoid of meaning, and the activities on your agenda tedious. They might even go against what you truly believe. It is clear. To become a good traveler in the modern world often entails more than just a change of attitude. It could also mean changing your life style, even your profession. It could mean taking risks in the process. But liberation has always been a risky undertaking, hasn’t it? People are willing to take risks for the most mundane things like profit and possession. Why not take a few risks when your spiritual progress is at stake? Truly good travelers often leave the beaten track and become masters of their own far more adventurous journeys. Tampering with the world Do you want to improve the world? I don't think it can be done. The world is sacred. It can't be improved. If you tamper with it, you'll ruin it. If you treat it like an object, you'll lose it. (Chapter 29) If anything, the Twentieth Century will be called the century of social engineering. Simplistic ideologies, like fascism, were used to try to change the world, with terrible consequences inducing suffering on a scale never seen before in the history of the human being. A savage economic system based on greed - capitalism - has ravaged the world. Yet, the human being has not learnt from this. Still, politicians show their ignorance by tampering with the sacred. It is the age of management, that euphemistic word for manipulating society. It is still happening. What else are many political programs but tampering with the sacred and ruining it in the process? It is the source of endless suffering. Forcing issues Whoever relies on the Tao in governing men doesn't try to force issues or defeat enemies by force of arms. For every force there is a counterforce. Violence, even well intentioned, always rebounds upon oneself. The Master does his job and then stops. He understands that the universe is forever out of control, and that trying to dominate events goes against the current of the Tao. (Chapter 30) Understanding that the universe is out of control is the key to wisdom and patience. No amount of tampering with the universe will change this. In fact, the more we tamper with it, the more damage we will do.

#### No one knows what is good and bad. Reject the aff’s judgments, even if we lose all life on earth

Kirkland 98 [Russell Kirkland, Associate Professor of Religion (and Asian Studies), “"Responsible Non-Action" In a Natural World: Perspectives from the Nei-Yeh, Chuang-Tzu, and Tao-Te Ching,” 1998, University of Georgia, http://kirkland.myweb.uga.edu/rk/pdf/pubs/ECO.pdf]

Why It Is Wrong to Resent Unexpected Changes In Chuang-tzu 18, we find two famous stories in which a man experiences a sudden and deeply personal transformation, a transformation that strikes others around him as deeply troubling.5 In one, the philosopher Hui-tzu goes to offer his sympathies to Chuang-tzu upon the event of the death of Chuang's wife. In the next story, a willow suddenly sprouts from the elbow of a fictional character. In each story, a sympathetic friend is shocked and dismayed to find that the first character in each story is not shocked and dismayed by the unexpected turn of events. In each story, the first character patiently and rationally explains the nature of life, and counsels his companion to accept the course of events that life brings to us, without imposing judgment as to the value of those events. In each case, the reader learns that it is foolish and inappropriate to feel emotional distress at such events, for a proper understanding of the real nature of life leads us to accept all events with the same equanimity, even those events that might have once sticken us as deeply distressing. In the Taoist classic Huai-nan-tzu, one finds a famous story of a man who suddenly finds himself the unexpected owner of a new horse. His neighbors congratulate him on his good fortune, until his son falls from the horse and breaks his leg. The man's neighbors then act to console him on his bad fortune, until army conscriptors arrive and carry off all the able-bodied young men, leaving the injured young man behind as worthless. The lesson of the story is that when an event occurs, we are quick to judge it as fortunate or unfortunate, but our judgments are often mistaken, as later events often prove.6 And one of the most heavily stressed lessons of the Chuang-tzu is that humans quickly judge events on the basis of what we accept on the basis of simplistic assumptions — e.g., that life is inherently better than death — and that the wise person learns to question and discard such assumptions, and forego such judgments regarding events. When Chuang-tzu's wife died, Chuang-tzu does not argue that the world is a better place for her absence, or that his life is improved by his sudden new freedom. In fact, there is no issue in the passage of whether the world is better off with Chuang-tzu's wife alive or dead. The only issue in the passage is that people are born and that people later die, and to ignore that basic fact would display culpable stupidity. The very same lesson is impressed upon the reader of the previous passage, regarding the sudden transformation of a character's elbow. What we are taught in that passage is that life is a process of ineluctable change and transformation, and that humans would be profoundly wrong and clearly silly to object to such change. Another element of the lesson is that the nature of human life is not separate from, or other than, the nature of nonhuman life. When one says that "life is ineluctable change, and we must accept such change with serenity," one is speaking about "life" in such a way that it clearly involves the lives of individual humans just as fully as it involves the events that occur in the broader world, and vice versa. Imagine the story of the death of Chuang-tzu's wife involving, instead, the death of the species we call whooping cranes: Chuang-tzu would, in that case, patiently point out to his deeply caring but deeply shallow friend that he had indeed felt grief to see such beautiful birds come to their end, but had gone on to engage in appropriate rational reflection upon the nature of life, and had come to accept the transitory nature of all such creatures, just as in the present story Chuang-tzu had come to accept the transitory nature of his own spouse. If one must learn to accept with serenity the death of someone we love, someone without whose life our own life would have never been what it is, wouldn't the author urge us to accept that the death of some birds, birds that have never played a role in our lives the way that one's deceased spouse had done, is an event that we should accept with equanimity? If change catches up with us, even to the extent that the planet that we live on should become permanently devoid of all forms of life, the response of the author of these passages would logically be that such is the nature of things, and that crying over such a sudden turn of events would be very silly indeed, like a child crying over a spilt glass of milk, or the death of some easily replaceable goldfish. The only reason that a child cries over the death of a goldfish is that he or she has become irrationally attached to that creature as it exists in its present form, and has formed an immature sentimental bond to it. As adults, we appreciate the color and motion of fish in our aquaria, but seldom cry over the death of one of its inmates: we know very well that to cry over the death of such a fish would be silly and a sign of juvenile behavior. As our children grow, we teach them, likewise, never to follow their raw emotional responses, but rather to govern their emotions, and to learn to behave in a responsible manner, according to principles that are morally correct, whether or not they are emotionally satisfying. If, for instance, one were to see a driver accidentally run over one's child or beloved, one's first instinct might be to attack the driver with a righteous fury, falsely equating emotional intensity and violent action with the responsible exercise of moral judgment. In general, we work to teach ourselves and each other not to respond in that way, to take a course of self-restraint, curbing emotion, lest it propel us into actions that will later, upon calm reflection, be revealed to have been emotionally satisfying but morally wrong. If I saw my child run down by a car, it might give me great emotional satisfaction to drag the driver from her car and beat her to death. But it might well turn out that she had in fact done nothing wrong, and had been driving legally and quite responsibly when a careless child suddenly ran into her path, giving her no time to stop or to evade the child. Because we have all learned that the truth of events is often not apparent to the parties that are experiencing them, we generally work to learn some degree of self-control, so that our immediate emotional reaction to events does not mislead us into a foolish course of action. Now if we take these facts and transfer them into our consideration of Chuang-tzu and Mencius on the riverbank, that episode should, logically, be read as follows. If Mencius feels an emotional urge to jump into the river to save the baby, his emotional response to the baby's presence there must be seen as immature and irresponsible. After all, one might muse, one never knows, any more than the man with the horse, when an event that seems fortunate is actually unfortunate, or vice versa. What if the baby in the water had been the ancient Chinese equivalent of Adolf Hitler, and the saving of young Adolf — though occasioned by the deepest feelings of compassion, and a deep-felt veneration for "life" — led to the systematic extermination of millions of innocent men, women, and children? If one knew, in retrospect, that Hitler's atrocities could have been totally prevented by the simple moral act of refraining from leaping to save an endangered child, would one not conclude, by sound moral reasoning, that letting that particular baby drown would have represented a supremely moral act? How, Chuang-tzu constantly challenges us, how can we possibly know what course of action is truly justified? What if, just for the sake of argument, a dreadful plague soon wipes out millions of innocent people, and the pathogen involved is soon traced back to an organism that had once dwelt harmlessly in the system of a certain species of bird, such as, for instance, the whooping crane? In retrospect, one can imagine, the afflicted people of the next century — bereft of their wives or husbands, parents or children — might curse the day when simple-minded do-gooders of the twentieth-century had brazenly intervened with the natural course of events and preserved the cursed specied of crane, thereby damning millions of innocents to suffering and death. We assume that such could never happen, that all living things are somehow inherently good to have on the planet, that saving the earthly existence of any life-form is somehow inherently a virtuous action. But our motivations in such cases are clearly, from a Taoist point of view, so shallow and foolish as to warrant no respect. If Mencius, or a sentimental modern lover of "life," were to leap into the river and save a floating baby, he or she would doubtless exult in his or her selfless act of moral heroism, deriving a sense of satisfaction from having done a good deed, and having prevented a terrible tragedy. But who can really know when a given event is truly a tragedy, or perhaps, like the horse that breaks a boy's leg, really a blessing in disguise. Since human wisdom, Chuang-tzu suggests, is inherently incapable of successfully comprehending the true meaning of events as they are happening, when can we ever truly know that our emotional urge to save babies, pretty birds, and entertaining sea-mammals is really an urge that is morally sound. The Taoist answer seems to be that we can never be sure, and even if the extinction of Chuangtzu's wife or of the whooping crane really brought no actual blessing to the world, such events are natural and proper in the way of life itself, and to bemoan such events is to show that one is no more insightful about life than a child who sentimentally cries over the loss of a toy, a glass of milk, a beloved pet, or even her mommy, run over by a drunken driver. The Taoist lesson seems, in this regard, to be the same in each case: things happen, and some things cause us distress because we attach ourselves sentimentally to certain people, objects, and patterns of life; when those people, objects, or patterns of life take a sudden or drastic turn into a very different direction, a mature and responsible person calms his or her irrational emotions, and takes the morally responsible course of simply accepting the new state of things.

#### Forego all action to achieve desired ends.

Kirkland 96 [Russell Kirkland, Associate Professor of Religion (and Asian Studies), “The Book of the Way,” 24-29, http://kirkland.myweb.uga.edu/rk/pdf/pubs/DAODE.pdf]

The Teachings of the Daode jing The focus of the Daode jing is something called "the Tao (or Dao)," a term that cannot adequately be translated. The text says that the Tao is "vague and subtle," and it never provides definitions. Instead, it employs metaphors to suggest the nature of the Tao, and to describe behaviors that are similar to its way of working. Most basically, the term Tao seems to denote a natural force that runs through all things and guides them through their natural course of development. It is an inexhaustible source of life and power, and is constantly at work in the world in subtle and imperceptible ways. Both its reality and its nature can be perceived by observing the world around us. However, most people have lost sight of the Tao, and have given way to unnatural behaviors that go contrary to it. The goal of the Daode jing is to persuade the reader to abandon those behaviors, and to learn once again how to live in accord with the true course of life. One can achieve those goals by appreciating the true nature of life, and modifying one's behavior to be more like that of the Tao. Specifically, the Tao is humble, yielding, and non-assertive. Like a mother, it benefits others selflessly: it gives us all life and guides us safely through it, asking nothing in return. This altruistic emphasis of the Daode jing has seldom been noticed, but it is one of the most important lessons that it draws from the observation of the natural world. Water, for instance, is the gentlest and most yielding of all things, yet it can overcome the strongest substances, and cannot itself be destroyed. More importantly, however, water lives for others: it provides the basis of life for all things, and asks nothing in return. If we learn to live like water does, we will be living in accord with the Tao, and its Power (De) will carry us safely through life. Such a way of life is called wuwei, usually translated as "non-action." Wuwei means foregoing all activity intended to effect desired ends. Instead, one should follow one's natural course and allow all other things to do likewise, lest our willful interference disrupt things' proper flow. Few modern readers have ever grasped the full radicality of the ideal of wuwei. Many of us today (like the ancient Chinese Confucians and Mohists) look at the world and see things that we think need correcting. The Daode jing would actually have us do nothing whatsoever about them. The repeated phrase "do nothing, and nothing will be undone" admonishes us to trust the Tao -- the natural working of things -- and never to do anything about anything. Actually, such is the most that anyone can do, because the Tao -- as imperceptible as it is -- is the most powerful force in existence, and nothing can thwart its unceasing operation.

#### Nature is benign—supposed “moral” intervention will only disrupt that process.

Kirkland 98 [Russell Kirkland, Associate Professor of Religion (and Asian Studies), “"Responsible Non-Action" In a Natural World: Perspectives from the Nei-Yeh, Chuang-Tzu, and Tao-Te Ching,” 1998, University of Georgia, http://kirkland.myweb.uga.edu/rk/pdf/pubs/ECO.pdf]

The reader of the Tao te ching, for instance, is certainly enjoined not to practice jen, the Confucian ideal of "benevolence." Since Heaven-and-Earth do not practice jen, there is certainly no good reason for any of us to do so. If we see a baby tottering on the edge of a well, a hurricane heading for a village, or an environmental change that seems to threaten the existence of a natural species or its habitat, the Taoist response to all such situations is clearly the same: do not, do not take interventional action! Only a fool would think himself wiser than the processes of nature itself. But doesn't such a position leave us with an apparent moral quandary? Wouldn't it be immoral to stand idly by and do nothing while a baby, a town, or a species is exterminated? Wouldn't inaction in such cases be immoral? Don't we have a moral responsibility to take heroic action to save those who are endangered, and thereby "foster life"? The answer to all these questions is a resounding yes — provided, that is, that one is a Christian, Confucian, or modern liberal! For everyone in those traditions, it would be unthinkable to stand idly by and allow anyone — human or nonhuman, individual or species — simply to die. But I shall be radical enough to argue that there is another perspective from which to view such issues, the perspective of those in ancient China who actually took seriously three utterly preposterous propositions: those propositions are (1) that the Tao exists, and (2) that it operates wisely and reliably, without human input or assistance, and (3) that anything that any human attempts to do in the world will inevitably interfere with that operation, leading ineluctably to unintended but quite avoidable tragedy. Such propositions are utterly at odds with certain fundamental assumptions of modern thought — secular or religious. To followers of Western religions, God created a world full of living things, them left them to fend for themselves, subject only to the stewardship of human beings, God's most intelligent creation. On the basis of that assumption, humans appear to have a moral responsibility to take action to protect and defend other creatures when necessary. Of course, such assumptions do not explain why God would create sentient beings and leave them at the mercy of processes beyond their control: for some unexplained reason, God — who is allwise and all-loving — is unwilling or unable to safeguard his own living creations, and must rely upon his human creations to do that job for him. The secular perspective, derived from the scenario just described, is that living things evolved without any input from higher forces, and are therefore at the mercy of natural processes and human actions. From this perspective, as from the Western religious perspective, there is no benign force that can be trusted to provide for the general welfare of earth's inhabitants, so when nonhuman creatures are threatened, there is no hope for them unless heroically beneficent humans take interventional action to save them. Humans who accept such assumptions and act upon them are widely regarded as "enlightened" and "compassionate."But such perspectives on the nature of life on earth make certain assumptions that no Taoist is ever going to make. Notice, for instance, that from the modern perspective, "natural processes" are not inherently benign: they either pose threats, such as when one creature's expanding habitat threatens another, or they are too weak to withstand the effects of human activity. From the modern perspective, (1) there is no force involved in life's affairs that is as powerful as that of human beings, and (2) while there may be a wiser consciousness than ours, it does not systematically protect or care for living things, so there is also no wiser involvement in life's affairs than our own. Ultimately, these perspectives assume human power and wisdom to be supreme, and they assume that "nature" is guided and protected by no benign forces beyond ourselves.

### 1NC—T

#### A. Interpretation—the aff has to defend USFG action energy production—‘resolved’ means to enact a policy by law.

Words and Phrases 64 (Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### B. Our interpretation is best ---

#### 1. Predictability—ignoring the resolution opens up an infinite number of topics—this undermines our ability to have in-depth research on their arguments destroying the value of debate.

#### 2. Ground—the resolution exists to create fair division of aff and neg ground—any alternative framework allows the aff to pick a moral high ground that destroys neg offense.

#### 3. Education—academics must learn to engage the public’s line of thinking—abstract moralism without addressing how to get our policies passed is useless.

Isaac 2—Jeffrey Isaac, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University [Spring 2002, “Ends, Means, and Politics,” *Dissent*, http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=601]

What is striking about much of the political discussion on the left today is its failure to engage this earlier tradition of argument. The left, particularly the campus left—by which I mean “progressive” faculty and student groups, often centered around labor solidarity organizations and campus Green affiliates—has become moralistic rather than politically serious. Some of its moralizing—about Chiapas, Palestine, and Iraq—continues the third worldism that plagued the New Left in its waning years. Some of it—about globalization and sweatshops— is new and in some ways promising (see my “Thinking About the Antisweatshop Movement,” *Dissent*, Fall 2001). But what characterizes much campus left discourse is a substitution of moral rhetoric about evil policies or institutions for a sober consideration of what might improve or replace them, how the improvement might be achieved, and what the likely costs, as well as the benefits, are of any reasonable strategy. One consequence of this tendency is a failure to worry about methods of securing political support through democratic means or to recognize the distinctive value of democracy itself. It is not that conspiratorial or antidemocratic means are promoted. On the contrary, the means employed tend to be preeminently democratic—petitions, demonstrations, marches, boycotts, corporate campaigns, vigorous public criticism. And it is not that political democracy is derided. Projects such as the Green Party engage with electoral politics, locally and nationally, in order to win public office and achieve political objectives. But what is absent is a sober reckoning with the preoccupations and opinions of the vast majority of Americans, who are not drawn to vocal denunciations of the International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organization and who do not believe that the discourse of “anti-imperialism” speaks to their lives. Equally absent is critical thinking about why citizens of liberal democratic states—including most workers and the poor—value liberal democracy and subscribe to what Jürgen Habermas has called “constitutional patriotism”: a patriotic identification with the democratic state because of the civil, political, and social rights it defends. Vicarious identifications with Subcommandante Marcos or starving Iraqi children allow left activists to express a genuine solidarity with the oppressed elsewhere that is surely legitimate in a globalizing age. But these symbolic avowals are not an effective way of contending for political influence or power in the society in which these activists live. The ease with which the campus left responded to September 11 by rehearsing an all too-familiar narrative of American militarism and imperialism is not simply disturbing. Itis a sign of this left’s alienation from the society in which it operates (the worst examples of this are statements of the Student Peace Action Coalition Network, which declare that “the United States Government is the world’s greatest terror organization,” and suggest that “homicidal psychopaths of the United States Government” engineered the World Trade Center attacks as a pretext for imperialist aggression. See http://www.gospan.org). Many left activists seem more able to identify with (idealized versions of) Iraqi or Afghan civilians than with American citizens, whether these are the people who perished in the Twin Towers or the rest of us who legitimately fear that we might be next. This is not because of any “disloyalty.” Charges like that lack intellectual or political merit. It is because of a debilitating *moralism*; because it is easier to denounce wrong than to take real responsibility for correcting it, easier to locate and to oppose a remote evil than to address a proximate difficulty. The campus left says what it thinks. But it exhibits little interest in how and why so many Americans think differently. The “peace” demonstrations organized across the country within a few days of the September 11 attacks—in which local Green Party activists often played a crucial role—were, whatever else they were, a sign of their organizers’ lack of judgment and common sense. Although they often expressed genuine horror about the terrorism, they focused their energy not on the legitimate fear and outrage of American citizens but rather on the evils of the American government and its widely supported response to the terror. Hardly anyone was paying attention, but they alienated anyone who was. This was utterly predictable. And that is my point. The predictable consequences did not matter. What mattered was simply the expression of righteous indignation about what is wrong with the United States, as if September 11 hadn’t really happened. Whatever one thinks about America’s deficiencies, it must be acknowledged that a political praxis preoccupation with this is foolish and self-defeating. The other, more serious consequence of this moralizing tendency is the failure to think seriously about global *politics*. The campus left is rightly interested in the ills of global capitalism. But politically it seems limited to two options: expressions of “solidarity” with certain oppressed groups—Palestinians but not Syrians, Afghan civilians (though not those who welcome liberation from the Taliban), but not Bosnians or Kosovars or Rwandans—and automatic opposition to American foreign policy in the name of anti-imperialism. The economic discourse of the campus left is a universalist discourse of human needs and workers rights; but it is accompanied by a refusal to think in *political* terms about the realities of states, international institutions, violence, and power. This refusal is linked to a peculiar strain of pacifism, according to which any use of military force by the United States is viewed as aggression or militarism. case in point is a petition circulated on the campus of Indiana University within days of September 11. Drafted by the Bloomington Peace Coalition, it opposed what was then an imminent war in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda, and called for peace. It declared: “Retaliation will not lead to healing; rather it will harm innocent people and further the cycle of violence. Rather than engage in military aggression, those in authority should apprehend and charge those individuals believed to be directly responsible for the attacks and try them in a court of law in accordance with due process of international law.” This declaration was hardly unique. Similar statements were issued on college campuses across the country, by local student or faculty coalitions, the national Campus Greens, 9- 11peace.org, and the National Youth and Student Peace Coalition. As Global Exchange declared in its antiwar statement of September 11: “vengeance offers no relief. . . retaliation can never guarantee healing. . . and to meet violence with violence breeds more rage and more senseless deaths. Only love leads to peace with justice, while hate takes us toward war and injustice.” On this view military action of any kind is figured as “aggression” or “vengeance”; harm to innocents, whether substantial or marginal, intended or unintended, is absolutely proscribed; legality is treated as having its own force, independent of any means of enforcement; and, most revealingly, “healing” is treated as the principal goal of any legitimate response. None of these points withstands serious scrutiny. A military response to terrorist aggression is not in any obvious sense an act of aggression, unless any military response—or at least any U.S. military response—is simply *defined* as aggression. While any justifiable military response should certainly be governed by just-war principles, the criterion of absolute harm avoidance would rule out the possibility of *any* military response. It is virtually impossible either to “apprehend” and prosecute terrorists or to put an end to terrorist networks without the use of military force, for the “criminals” in question are not law-abiding citizens but mass murderers, and there are no police to “arrest” them. And, finally, while “healing” is surely a legitimate moral goal, it is not clear that it is a *political* goal. Justice, however, most assuredly is a political goal. The most notable thing about the Bloomington statement is its avoidance of political justice. Like many antiwar texts, it calls for “social justice abroad.” It supports redistributing wealth. But criminal and retributive justice, protection against terrorist violence, or the political enforcement of the minimal conditions of global civility—these are unmentioned. They are unmentioned because to broach them is to enter a terrain that the campus left is unwilling to enter—the terrain of violence, a realm of complex choices and dirty hands. This aversion to violence is understandable and in some ways laudable. America’s use of violence has caused much harm in the world, from Southeast Asia to Central and Latin America to Africa. The so-called “Vietnam Syndrome” was the product of a real learning experience that should not be forgotten. In addition, the destructive capacities of modern warfare— which jeopardize the civilian/combatant distinction, and introduce the possibility of enormous ecological devastation—make war under any circumstances something to be feared. No civilized person should approach the topic of war with anything other than great trepidation. And yet the left’s reflexive hostility toward violence in the international domain is strange. It is inconsistent with avowals of “materialism” and evocations of “struggle,” especially on the part of those many who are *not* pacifists; it is in tension with a commitment to human emancipation (is there no cause for which it is justifiable to fight?); and it is oblivious to the tradition of left thinking about ends and means. To compare the debates within the left about the two world wars or the Spanish Civil War with the predictable “anti-militarism” of today’s campus left is to compare a discourse that was serious about political power with a discourse that is not. This unpragmatic approach has become a hallmark of post–cold war left commentary, from the Gulf War protests of 1991, to the denunciation of the 1999 U.S.-led NATO intervention in Kosovo, to the current post–September 11 antiwar movement. In each case protesters have raised serious questions about U.S. policy and its likely consequences, but in a strikingly ineffective way. They sound a few key themes: the broader context of grievances that supposedly explains why Saddam Hussein, or Slobodan Milosevic, or Osama bin Laden have done what they have done; the hypocrisy of official U.S. rhetoric, which denounces terrorism even though the U.S. government has often supported terrorism; the harm that will come to ordinary Iraqi or Serbian or Afghan citizens as a result of intervention; and the cycle of violence that is likely to ensue. These are important issues. But they typically are raised by left critics not to promote real debate about practical alternatives, but to avoid such a debate or to trump it. As a result, the most important political questions are simply not asked. It is assumed that U.S. military intervention is an act of “aggression,” but no consideration is given to the aggression to which intervention is a response. The status quo ante in Afghanistan is not, as peace activists would have it, peace, but rather terrorist violence abetted by a regime—the Taliban—that rose to power through brutality and repression. This requires us to ask a question that most “peace” activists would prefer not to ask: *What should be done to respond to the violence of a Saddam Hussein, or a Milosevic, or a Taliban regime?* What means are likely to stop violence and bring criminals to justice? Calls for diplomacy and international law are well intended and important; they implicate a decent and civilized ethic of global order. But they are also vague and empty, because they are not accompanied by any account of how diplomacy or international law can work effectively to address the problem at hand. The campus left offers no such account. To do so would require it to contemplate tragic choices in which moral goodness is of limited utility. Here what matters is not purity of intention but the intelligent exercise of power. Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits this judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

#### C. Voting issue—resolving the topicality is a pre-condition for debate to occur.

Shively 2k—Ruth Lessl Shively, Assistant Prof Political Science, Texas A&M University [Partisan Politics and Political Theory, p. 181-2]

The requirements given thus far are primarily negative. The ambiguists must say "no" to-they must reject and limit-some ideas and actions. In what follows, we will also find that they must say "yes" to some things. In particular, they must say "yes" to the idea of rational persuasion. This means, first, that they must recognize the role of agreement in political contest, or the basic accord that is necessary to discord. The mistake that the ambiguists make here is a common one. The mistake is in thinking that agreement marks the end of contest-that consensus kills debate. But this is true only if the agreement is perfect-if there is nothing at all left to question or contest. In most cases, however, our agreements are highly imperfect. We agree on some matters but not on others, on generalities but not on specifics, on principles but not on their applications, and so on. And this kind of limited agreement is the *starting* condition of contest and debate. As John Courtney Murray writes: We hold certain truths; therefore we can argue about them. It seems to have been one of the corruptions of intelligence by positivism to assume that argument ends when agreement is reached. In a basic sense, the reverse is true. There can be no argument except on the premise, and within a context, of agreement. (Murray 1960, 10) In other words, we cannot argue about something if we are not communicating: if we cannot agree on the topic and terms of argument or if we have utterly different ideas about what counts as evidence or good argument. At the very least, we must agree about what it is that is being debated before we can debate it. For instance, one cannot have an argument about euthanasia with someone who thinks euthanasia is a musical group. One cannot successfully stage a sit-in if one's target audience simply thinks everyone is resting or if those doing the sitting have no complaints. Nor can one demonstrate resistance to a policy if no one knows that it is a policy. In other words, contest is meaningless if there is a lack of agreement or communication about what is being contested. Resisters, demonstrators, and debaters must have some shared ideas about the subject and/or the terms of their disagreements. The participants and the target of a sit-in must share an understanding of the complaint at hand. And a demonstrator's audience must know what is being resisted. In short, the contesting of an idea presumes some agreement about what that idea is and how one might go about intelligibly contesting it. In other words, contestation rests on some basic agreement or harmony.

#### They’ll say that our argument is exclusionary, but they have excluded us from the debate—basic fairness is a reason to vote negative.

Galloway 7 — Ryan Galloway, Assistant Professor and Director of Debate at Samford University, 2007 (“Dinner and Conversation at the Argumentative Table: Re-Conceptualizing Debate As An Argumentative Dialogue,” *Contemporary Argumentation & Debate*, Volume 28, September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Premier, p. 12)

While affirmative teams often accuse the negative of using a juridical rule to exclude them, the affirmative also relies upon an unstated rule to exclude the negative response. This unstated but understood rule is that the negative speech act must serve to negate the affirmative act. Thus, affirmative teams often exclude an entire range of negative arguments, including arguments designed to challenge the hegemony, domination, and oppression inherent in topical approaches to the resolution. Becoming more than just a ritualistic tag-line of “fairness, education, time skew, voting issue,” fairness exists in the implicit right to be heard in a meaningful way. Ground is just that—a ground to stand on, a ground to speak from, a ground by which to meaningfully contribute to an ongoing conversation.

#### And fairness comes first—absent fairness, debate as an activity would cease to exist.

Speice and Lyle 3 — Patrick Speice, Debater at Wake Forest University, and Jim Lyle, Director of Debate at Clarion University, 2003 (“Traditional Policy Debate: Now More Than Ever,” *Debater’s Research Guide*, Available Online at http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/ MiscSites/DRGArticles/SpeiceLyle2003htm.htm, Accessed 09-11-2005)

As with any game or sport, creating a level playing field that affords each competitor a fair chance of victory is integral to the continued existence of debate as an activity. If the game is slanted toward one particular competitor, the other participants are likely to pack up their tubs and go home, as they don’t have a realistic shot of winning such a “rigged game.” Debate simply wouldn’t be fun if the outcome was pre-determined and certain teams knew that they would always win or lose. The incentive to work hard to develop new and innovative arguments would be non-existent because wins and losses would not relate to how much research a particular team did. TPD, as defined above, offers the best hope for a level playing field that makes the game of debate fun and educational for all participants.

#### They’ll say limits are bad, but constraints are more conducive to creative thinking—following the rules is key to innovation.

Gibbert et al. 7 — Michael Gibbert, Assistant Professor of Management at Bocconi University (Italy), et al., with Martin Hoeglis, Professor of Leadership and Human Resource Management at WHU—Otto Beisheim School of Management (Germany), and Lifsa Valikangas, Professor of Innovation Management at the Helsinki School of Economics (Finland) and Director of the Woodside Institute, 2007 (“In Praise of Resource Constraints,” *MIT Sloan Management Review*, Spring, Available Online at https://umdrive.memphis.edu/gdeitz/public/The%20Moneyball%20Hypothesis/Gibbert%20et%20al.%20-%20SMR%20(2007)%20Praise%20Resource%20Constraints.pdf, Accessed 04-08-2012, p. 15-16)

Resource constraints can also fuel innovative team performance directly. In the spirit of the proverb "necessity is the mother of invention," [end page 15] teams may produce better results because of resource constraints. Cognitive psychology provides experimental support for the "less is more" hypothesis. For example, scholars in creative cognition find in laboratory tests that subjects are most innovative when given fewer rather than more resources for solving a problem.

The reason seems to be that the human mind is most productive when restricted. Limited—or better focused—by specific rules and constraints, we are more likely to recognize an unexpected idea. Suppose, for example, that we need to put dinner on the table for unexpected guests arriving later that day. The main constraints here are the ingredients available and how much time is left. One way to solve this problem is to think of a familiar recipe and then head off to the supermarket for the extra ingredients. Alternatively, we may start by looking in the refrigerator and cupboard to see what is already there, then allowing ourselves to devise innovative ways of combining subsets of these ingredients. Many cooks attest that the latter option, while riskier, often leads to more creative and better appreciated dinners. In fact, it is the option invariably preferred by professional chefs.

The heightened innovativeness of such "constraints-driven" solutions comes from team members' tendencies, under the circumstances, to look for alternatives beyond "how things are normally done," write C. Page Moreau and Darren W. Dahl in a 2005 Journal of Consumer Research article. Would-be innovators facing constraints are more likely to find creative analogies and combinations that would otherwise be hidden under a glut of resources.

### 1NC—CP

#### The United States Federal Government should provide necessary financial incentives for community-planned solar and wind energy production.

#### The counterplan only offers the incentive to collaborative or community planned projects—we PIC out of the central or corporate planning most likely to occur in the status quo.

#### The net benefit:

#### First, collaborative community planning is the only way to convince skeptics, offset the interests of big power companies, encourage investment, and durably institutionalize sustainable values—the plan and permutation will get rejected by locals

Wolsnik 7 [Marteen, Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam “Planning of renewables schemes: Deliberative and fair decision-making on landscape issues instead of reproachful accusations of non-cooperation” Energy Policy 35 (2007) 2692–2704]

Planning regimes that are supportive of wind power (or renewable) policy and are positive towards wind power implementation are requisite for the successful deployment of wind power. However, such policies do not always have an unambiguous character, and their objectives depend on¶ the social and political constellation, which are affected by social and political culture. The real preferences within the ideology of governments, but also the institutionalized power of significant sectors such as energy companies, are factors that determine clear choices, for example in designing financial procurement systems. These settings are also significant for the degree to which grass-roots initiatives in wind power and renewables are anticipated. Are such initiatives allowed to influence policy, or does national policy keep those groups at a distance? In general terms: what is the institutional capacity in a country for ecological modernization (Ja¨ nicke, 1997; Weidner, 2002) with regards to the development and application of renewables? For example, is the ideological character or the organizational fragmentation of those groups a factor that impedes cooperation in policy-making?

National policy defines the objectives, conditions and instruments of financial procurement. Regimes that consistently¶ offer terms that allow profitable wind power¶ schemes to be established according to national targets are¶ a basic premise of successful wind power programmes¶ (Toke, 2005). Furthermore, the stability of the regime over time affects investment decisions, and the conditions of the¶ financial regime may discriminate between categories of¶ investors. The degree of support for financial procurement regimes that do not primarily support the initiatives of the power sector has an important influence on the effectiveness of the financial support mechanism.

Democratic planning (Holden, 1998), incremental planning,¶ collaborative planning and collaborative learning¶ (Healey, 2006) are all concepts that advocate increased collaboration and participation in planning processes.¶ Today, it can be argued that the idea of a ‘rational’ planning of society has been replaced with a vision of governance characterized by networking, negotiable relationships,¶ stakeholder participation and public–private¶ partnerships. In this paper, the decisive significance of collaborative planning is analysed, in particular in connection¶ with the way crucial values are allowed to influence decision-making. In the case of wind turbines, these crucial¶ values concern landscape quality and its preservation.¶ None of the centrally organized institutional variables concerning planning and policy is sufficient to explain differences among the six country cases. Cultural preferences¶ for countryside landscape preservation, a lack of locally organized and popularly owned wind power, and political institutions that do not support local collaborative approaches can all act to reduce the success of national wind power programmes. The level at which the real¶ decisions are taken about investments and the siting of¶ wind power schemes is crucial. In most countries (except¶ Spain), this is the local level. The key question is how¶ decision-making on that level is organized and how social¶ networks that may operate on either the same or other¶ levels try to influence those decisions. Hence, the institutional setting of the ‘decision-making level’ is highly significant for the aggregate outcome of wind power¶ implementation at the national level. It is not the mere existence of negative attitudes as such that is impeding¶ wind power implementation. Such attitudes exist everywhere¶ (though hardly as a majority opinion), but it is important how negative attitudes are represented within the network at the decision-making level. Important¶ aspects of these networks are not only those who oppose wind farm developments, but also whether there are significant local networks that support wind farm developments,¶ for instance through locally owned schemes.

It should be emphasized that Fig. 1 does not present¶ public attitudes as such as a major factor, as the nature of¶ public attitudes in implementation issues is often misunderstood.¶ Here, the central category of landscape values¶ represents attitudes, because the most salient public¶ concerns in considering the costs and benefits of a wind¶ power scheme involve landscape values. These are highly¶ culturally determined and can affect local decision-making¶ in different ways, depending on the local political institutional¶ setting of local decision-making processes. In the case of collaborative decision-making, the significant¶ discussions about the benefits and costs of a wind power scheme will be about the visual impact and how to fit the¶ wind farm into the landscape. Concerns may be accommodated, and conditional supporters or sceptics need not become anti-wind. If local interests are not given a voice in decision-making processes, conditional supporters may turn into objectors. Why this should be the case is¶ illustrated in the following sections. The distinction¶ between conditional supporters and fundamentally antiwind¶ power groups is an important one. The latter are also¶ inspired by their basic concerns about scenic values, the¶ countryside and national heritage. Their aim, however, is¶ to oppose wind power regardless of the variations in size,¶ location, design, ownership, etc. that are possible in the¶ scheme. This will negatively affect collaborative approaches¶ because such groups are not inclined to cooperate.¶ Hence, it is not only the values as such, but also—¶ and particularly—the institutionalization of those values in current practices and organizations (nationally as well as locally) that affect outcomes in terms of implementation.

3. Identification of the issue¶ 3.1. Research question¶ Central in Fig. 1 is a category that is directly or indirectly¶ affected by all other institutional factors, namely by the amount of stimulation or impediment of collaborative approaches in the decision-making about individual wind¶ power schemes. Issues of public acceptance and support from significant stakeholders—including investors, local and regional authorities, organizations of the civil society, etc.—are dependant on that variable. However, there is atendency towards the idea that at the central (national) level it is possible to determine the exact dimensions of individual wind power schemes, and that is a tragic mistake. The fact that the policy option for subsidies in¶ capital investment was based on the generating capacity of¶ wind turbines is a Dutch example of this misunderstanding.¶ The result was that Dutch manufacturers artificially¶ boosted the kW rating of their turbines in order to¶ maximize their subsidies. In the end, these machines could¶ not compete on the international market. Making space for¶ wind farms also relied on top–down planning (Breukers¶ and Wolsink, 2007a).

#### Second, collaborative planning is key to lock-in sustainable values and create a broader environmental movement—centrally planned initiatives have ADVERSE effects

Wolsnik 7 [Marteen, Department of Geography, Planning and International Development Studies, University of Amsterdam “Planning of renewables schemes: Deliberative and fair¶ decision-making on landscape issues instead of reproachful¶ accusations of non-cooperation” Energy Policy 35 (2007) 2692–2704]

6. Conclusion: open decision-making is crucial to ecological¶ modernization¶ The application of wind energy is governmental policy,¶ and in most countries (with the notable exception of Spain;¶ Toke et al., 2008) changing a zoning scheme is a local¶ political decision. At the level of central government, there is a growing top–down, technocratic, hierarchical way of thinking about how the planning system must be shaped.¶ This view on the practice of planning is mainly a myth,¶ because although central authorities have legal competence¶ for instructing local authorities about specific parts of their¶ zoning schemes, these powers are hardly ever used in¶ practice.

The environmental capacity of a society can be developed by modernization (Ja¨ nicke, 1997). Central institutions of the society can be modernized and transformed in order¶ to improve the environmental capacity. In his comparative¶ studies on the environmental capacity of nations, Ja¨ nicke¶ found a few factors that are favourable for the development¶ of this capacity. Ecological modernization is the process of the incremental progressive modernization of society by sectoral macro-economic shifts, supported at the micro level by the application of new, clean technologies by¶ individual firms and consumers. The theory is also¶ applicable to, for example, the macro shift from energyintensive¶ towards energy-extensive sectors, and from¶ energy-inefficient (fossil-fuel-based) technology towards¶ energy-efficient and renewable-based technology at the¶ micro level. Hence, when we look at the framework in Fig.¶ 1, planning regimes and decision-making practices that¶ really enhance the implementation processes of renewable¶ energy require ‘strong’ ecological modernization.

Some of the key characteristics of ecological modernization are¶ (Gibbs, 2000):¶ Open, democratic decision-making, rather than technocratic and corporatist-style decision-making.¶ Participation and involvement, rather than planning and decision-making carried out by scientific, economic and political elites.¶ Open-ended approaches that allow multiple views, rather than the imposition of single, closed-ended proposals.¶ Broad changes in institutions, incorporating environmental concerns, rather than technological solutions to environmental problems.

Openness in decision-making and participation are not only consequences of a normative choice: they have also become more instrumental to the transition towards environmentally sound production and consumption, and¶ to environmentally respectful planning (Vigar and Healey,¶ 2002). The implementation of modern, clean technology is simply hardly possible without institutional changes; without such changes, such implementation may eventually lead to adverse effects. Openness and participation are needed in order to learn and to create perceived fairness,¶ which is why we have to escape from technocratic and corporatist styles of planning, carried out by economic, scientific and political elites.

Comparing countries with a poor performance as regards the implementation of wind with successful countries reveals obvious differences, such as the way in¶ which projects are developed and decisions are taken as¶ regards locations. Moreover, these decisions are actually¶ taken at the local level, whereas real options for locals to become involved in investing in the wind projects may generate positive effects for success. Countries with a huge potential, but with very disappointing installed capacity, such as the UK, are now starting to realize that this factor¶ has even severely hampered the development of a wind¶ industry (Strachan et al., 2006). The best way to facilitate the development of appropriate wind farms is to build institutional capital (knowledge resources, relational resources, capacity for mobilization; Healey, 2006; Breukers,¶ 2007).

Policy actors and wind power developers should focus on building up institutional capital for wind power and other renewable resources. This can be done with collaborative approaches to planning and by drawing on social capital (Rydin and Holman, 2004) instead of¶ complaining about public attitudes. Researchers investigating¶ the implementation process, now internationally¶ recognize this need for a collaborative approach in making¶ wind power implementation effective. However, planning systems in most countries do not encourage open, collaborative planning processes or community involvement¶ in wind power developments. Some systems even¶ impede it (Wolsink, 2003; So¨ derholm et al., 2007). The impact of such framing conditions is largely underestimated,¶ and often not even recognized, in policy. The¶ simplified views, for example on impediments to wind¶ power implementation caused by spatial planning processes,¶ are mostly based on false notions of the nature and¶ impact of public attitudes. The impact of public attitudes¶ on the success or failure of wind power implementation is¶ usually overestimated. At the same time, the valuable¶ information that comes from well-executed, theory-based¶ attitude research is largely not recognized and is interpreted¶ with a strong bias. Decision-making on renewable power facilities does not usually include the most important discussion point for public stakeholders. In the¶ case of wind power schemes, this is the choice of the¶ location, which determines the assessment of whether and,¶ if so, how and how much landscape values will be affected.¶ Theoretically, several different schemes on different sites¶ should be developed before a choice is made, but this¶ almost never happens. A location is selected beforehand¶ and top–down planning is then started. Consultation after¶ a plan has been announced is more of a trigger for¶ opposition than an incentive for the proper design of¶ acceptable projects.

Although all renewables have specific characteristics,¶ and these factors consequently manifest themselves indifferent ways, it is likely that they will be applicable to¶ sources of energy other than wind. Central planning usually has several objectives and these often have a detrimental effect on the goal of renewable energy application. Successful investments and the siting of wind¶ power plants eventually determine the success rate of national efforts in establishing renewable capacity. Moreover,¶ the current problems related to implementation¶ decisions concerning wind power schemes are an example¶ to those who will be faced by other renewable power¶ plants, notably biomass (Upreti, 2004; Khan, 2004). The¶ risks associated with biomass are even more serious, and¶ these also concern local identity and landscape quality,¶ though in a less visual way. Biomass energy production¶ that applies sustainability criteria needs to maintain¶ conditions concerning water consumption and the reduced¶ application of non-renewable resources (fossil fuel, phosphates)¶ that will lead to low productivity per hectare. This¶ requires highly efficient recycling schemes and a very¶ strong emission control regime. As ‘presumable future¶ practices may well be different’ (Reijnders, 2006), it is¶ very likely that many decisions concerning biomass¶ plants as well as sites for energy crops will generate local¶ conflicts. The future application of genetic modification in¶ energy crops will enhance that perspective. The safety¶ issues of genetic modification of crops—which will also be¶ revealed in siting conflicts—similarly require greater¶ transparency in decision-making and public participation¶ (Byrne, 2006). Solar PV energy conversion has hardly¶ reached a stage at which feasible implementation is¶ possible. However, the first signs are that the public acceptability of sites—in particular when it is not adoption or implementation by individual households but implementation at the community level—is going to play a similarly significant role in the development of solar PV systems.

### 1NC—Elections

#### Obama will win—key states, electoral votes, Nate Silver, and Intrade.

Lobe 9/8/12—Washington Bureau Chief of the International News Agency Inter Press Service (IPS), JD Berkeley [Jim Lobe, U.S.: Advantage Obama As Election Begins in Earnest, <http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/09/u-s-advantage-obama-as-election-begins-in-earnest/>]

Despite persistent high levels of unemployment and some 60 percent of the electorate telling pollsters that the country is headed “in the wrong direction”, most political analysts believe that Obama enters the final 60 days of the race with a leg up over his challenger.

The latest Gallup poll, released just hours after Obama’s acceptance speech Thursday night at the Democratic convention in Charlotte, North Carolina—another key swing state—showed Obama with a 48-45 percent lead over Romney and with a 52-percent overall job approval rating, his highest since June 2011, when he was still basking in the afterglow of the successful U.S. commando raid that killed Al-Qaeda’s chief, Osama bin Laden—an event to which many speakers referred repeatedly during the proceedings.

Gallup suggested in its analysis that Obama appeared likely to benefit from a bigger post-convention “bounce” in the polls than Romney received after the Republican convention in Tampa, Florida, the week before. Indeed, Romney’s “bounce” coming off the convention was virtually non-existent, according to the polls.

Because the president is not elected by the popular vote, however, both political experts and the two campaigns are focused much more on the swing states—those that are considered neither solidly Republican (red) nor Democratic (blue)—that will decide outcome.

Instead of a direct popular vote, the president and vice president are actually elected by an “electoral college” in which each state is allocated a certain number of votes based on their representation in the U.S. Congress.

Almost all states use a “winner-take-all” formula in which whatever candidate wins a majority of the state’s vote receives all of that state’s electoral votes. To win, a candidate must receive a total of at least 271 electoral votes in the electoral college.

Thus, the country’s most populous state, California, has 55 electoral votes all of which will, as appears virtually certain given California’s strongly Democratic electorate, be cast in Obama’s favour. The second-most populous state, Texas, has 38 electoral votes all of which, given the state’s strongly Republican cast, will almost certainly go to Romney.

According to most political analysts, including Republicans, Obama enjoys a significant advantage in the electoral contest.

Current polling shows Romney and his running-mate, Wisconsin Rep. Joe Ryan, with a decisive lead in more states, especially in the Midwest and the Southeast, than Obama and Vice President Joe Biden. But the combined electoral votes of those solidly Republican states come to less than those—including California, New York, New Jersey, Illinois, and Washington State—where the Democratic ticket is considered sure to win.

Different analysts disagree on precisely what constitutes a decisive lead. CNN, for example, currently estimates 237 electoral votes are either solidly in or leaning strongly toward Obama’s column, compared to 191 in Romney’s. Estimates by the Congressional Quarterly a week ago yielded a closer result—201-191.

Analysts likewise disagree on how many toss-up, or swing, states remain. Going into this week’s Democratic convention, CNN named seven states—Florida, Virginia, New Hampshire, Ohio, Iowa, Colorado, and Nevada as true toss-ups. It found four other states—North Carolina, Indiana, Missouri, and Arizona—“leaning” to the Republican ticket, and four more—New Mexico, Wisconsin (despite Ryan’s candidacy), Michigan, and Pennsylvania—“leaning” toward Obama.

If the leaning states fell into their respective columns, Obama would lead Romney by a 247-206 margin and put him within relatively easy striking distance of the magic 271 electoral votes needed to win.

The fact that Obama swept all seven of the remaining toss-up states in 2008 is seen here as making Romney’s task considerably more difficult, particularly given the growing voting strength of Latinos—whose appeals for immigration reform were soundly rebuffed at the Republican convention—in Nevada and Colorado—and concerns among the substantial numbers of retired and elderly voters in Florida about what the Republicans intend to do about the Social Security and Medicare programmes.

In addition, the commitment of former President Bill Clinton—the only living national politician with a 70-percent approval rating whose rousing nomination speech for Obama Thursday fired up the convention in Charlotte and drew rave reviews from all but the most right-wing commentators—to play an active role in the campaign, especially in the industrial swing states, could help shore up support for Obama among white male—especially blue-collar — voters who, of all demographic groups, are seen as most susceptible to Romney’s appeals.

Indeed, those who are actually betting money on the race give Obama much better odder than the polls would suggest. As of Friday, Intrade, the main U.S. on-line betting site, is giving Obama a 59-percent chance of winning, up from a mid-June low of around 54 percent.

The New York Times’ polling guru, Nate Silver, who pays closest attention to state polling, rates Obama’s chances of winning even higher. While Obama will win 51.3 percent of the popular vote Nov 6, Silver estimated Friday, the electoral margin is likely be 313-225 margin. Based on his statistical methods, Silver, the accuracy of whose predictions in the 2008 election persuaded the Times to hire him, is currently estimating Obama’s chances of winning at 77.3 percent.

Of course, all of these predictions could still be upset by a number of intervening factors, such as a sharp rise in unemployment, which is still running at more than eight percent, or a major international crisis, although Obama appears far more eager to inject foreign-policy issues into the campaign than Romney whose failure to praise the U.S. military in his nomination acceptance speech in Tampa was widely criticised, even by fellow-Republicans.

#### Focus on renewables would be political suicide—loses Obama the election

Aardvark 9/5/2012 [Tory, Talking about climate change is political suicide. http://toryaardvark.com/2012/09/05/talking-about-climate-change-is-political-suicide/]

The Democrats are holding their national convention in Charlotte, NC and working hard to get Barack Obama elected for a second term as US President. Back in 2008 Obama’s Green credentials were impeccable, a man for whom the “science” of climate change was forever settled, Obama was perceived by the watermelons as the man who would help force their Green agenda on the world.

As the race for the Presidency hots up you would expect Big Green policies and fear stories to be a big part of the whole shebang, yet, as a reporter for ecomentalist NGO Grist has found out, Climate Change is most definitely not on the agenda for Obama:

Michelle Obama, Julián Castro, Deval Patrick, and other headliners on the convention’s opening night had the audience and the pundits swooning. But none of the major speakers made even a passing reference to climate change or other green issues. The one prime-time speaker who mentioned environmental protection was Rhode Island Gov. Lincoln Chafee, a one-time Republican gone rogue.

I hit up some delegates for their insights on the omission, starting with a Houstonian next to me in the nosebleed section of the Time Warner Cable Arena. Had she heard any commentary on climate and energy? Had I missed something? She looked at me blankly. “No,” she said. “I think that’s scheduled for another night.” Scheduled for another night, that is a big No then. An environmental lawyer from Oklahoma City told me, “Nobody’s talking about the environment because it’s political suicide. Voters want jobs, and after Solyndra, you just can’t convince voters that cleantech will do anything but lose them.”

That is one of the big problems facing the Greens, ordinary people are becoming smarter and the Greenwash about millions of jobs and a prosperous zero carbon economy is never going to happen because the whole house of cards is based on that traditional socialist crusade, wealth redistribution, rather than wealth creation.

#### Romney will undermine Russia relations

Larison 6/27/12—Columnist for the American Conservative [Daniel Larison “U.S.-Russian Relations Would Get Much Worse Under Romney” http://www.theamericanconservative.com/larison/u-s-russian-relations-would-get-much-worse-under-romney/]

Putin doesn’t actually want a “hard-line conservative in the White House.” Putin distrusts the U.S. because he believes that the Bush administration behaved in an ungrateful and untrustworthy fashion in the previous decade, and U.S.-Russian relations improved as much as they did because the current administration seemed to be more reliable. U.S.-Russian relations reached their lowest point in the last twenty years in no small part because of a “more active U.S. policy” toward the Middle East, the South Caucasus, and central Europe. Putin might be willing to deal with a more hard-line American President, but only so long as it this translated into tangible gains for Russia. Provided that the hard-liner was willing to live up to his end of the bargain, there could be some room for agreement, but there isn’t any. Since Romney’s Russia policy is essentially to never make any deals with the current Russian government, Putin doesn’t have much of an incentive to cooperate. That will guarantee that U.S.-Russian relations will deteriorate much more than they have in the last year.

#### Nuclear war—Terrorism, Prolif, multiple hotspots, turns case

Allison 11—Director @ Belfer Center for Science and Int’l Affairs @ Harvard’s Kennedy School, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense, Robert D. Blackwill, Senior Fellow—Council on Foreign Relations [Graham Allison, “10 Reasons Why Russia Still Matters”, Politico -- October 31 -- <http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=161EF282-72F9-4D48-8B9C-C5B3396CA0E6>]

That central point is that Russia matters a great deal to a U.S. government seeking to defend and advance its national interests. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to return next year as president makes it all the more critical for Washington to manage its relationship with Russia through coherent, realistic policies. No one denies that Russia is a dangerous, difficult, often disappointing state to do business with. We should not overlook its many human rights and legal failures. Nonetheless, Russia is a player whose choices affect our vital interests in nuclear security and energy. It is key to supplying 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Ten realities require U.S. policymakers to advance our nation’s interests by engaging and working with Moscow. First, Russia remains the only nation that can erase the United States from the map in 30 minutes. As every president since John F. Kennedy has recognized, Russia’s cooperation is critical to averting nuclear war. Second, Russia is our most consequential partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. Through a combination of more than $11 billion in U.S. aid, provided through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program, and impressive Russian professionalism, two decades after the collapse of the “evil empire,” not one nuclear weapon has been found loose. Third, Russia plays an essential role in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile-delivery systems. As Washington seeks to stop Iran’s drive toward nuclear weapons, Russian choices to sell or withhold sensitive technologies are the difference between failure and the possibility of success. Fourth, Russian support in sharing intelligence and cooperating in operations remains essential to the U.S. war to destroy Al Qaeda and combat other transnational terrorist groups. Fifth, Russia provides a vital supply line to 100,000 U.S. troops fighting in Afghanistan. As U.S. relations with Pakistan have deteriorated, the Russian lifeline has grown ever more important and now accounts for half all daily deliveries. Sixth, Russia is the world’s largest oil producer and second largest gas producer. Over the past decade, Russia has added more oil and gas exports to world energy markets than any other nation. Most major energy transport routes from Eurasia start in Russia or cross its nine time zones. As citizens of a country that imports two of every three of the 20 million barrels of oil that fuel U.S. cars daily, Americans feel Russia’s impact at our gas pumps. Seventh, Moscow is an important player in today’s international system. It is no accident that Russia is one of the five veto-wielding, permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as well as a member of the G-8 and G-20. A Moscow more closely aligned with U.S. goals would be significant in the balance of power to shape an environment in which China can emerge as a global power without overturning the existing order. Eighth, Russia is the largest country on Earth by land area, abutting China on the East, Poland in the West and the United States across the Arctic. This territory provides transit corridors for supplies to global markets whose stability is vital to the U.S. economy. Ninth, Russia’s brainpower is reflected in the fact that it has won more Nobel Prizes for science than all of Asia, places first in most math competitions and dominates the world chess masters list. The only way U.S. astronauts can now travel to and from the International Space Station is to hitch a ride on Russian rockets. The co-founder of the most advanced digital company in the world, Google, is Russian-born Sergei Brin. Tenth, Russia’s potential as a spoiler is difficult to exaggerate. Consider what a Russian president intent on frustrating U.S. international objectives could do — from stopping the supply flow to Afghanistan to selling S-300 air defense missiles to Tehran to joining China in preventing U.N. Security Council resolutions. So next time you hear a policymaker dismissing Russia with rhetoric about “who cares?” ask them to identify nations that matter more to U.S. success, or failure, in advancing our national interests.

### 1NC—Case

**Changing growth to solve climate change works – radical social change won’t.**

Manuel Arias-**MALDONADO** Poli Sci @ Malaga **’12** *Real Green: Sustainability After the End of Nature* p. 116-120

In principle, public opinion should just rely on science- hence the activity of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change as a bridge between science and the public. But then again, we have read Kuhn and Fereyabend: the sociology of scientific knowledge has convinced us that society is inside the laboratory and science can only reflect social priorities and political interests. How can we just rely on science? To some, actually, climatology is not saying the truth about global warming (Leroux 2005). Yet science must still be our standpoint, for there is no better alternative, even though it is a "post-normal science" whereby "facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decision urgent" (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993: 742). However, a misunderstanding should be avoided. It is in this context that Sheila Jasanoff (2007) has advocated the need to produce a more humble science, one that leaves room for ethics and renounces the modem dream of a complete control over nature. That is just about right. But the reflective re-shaping of socionatural relations, up to a point where we try to regulate the oscillations of the climate with our actions, is not precisely a humble goal, nor an absurd one, especially since there is no direct relation between the current scientific consensus and the green radical vision of a de-industrialised society. Although action must be taken, it should be a proportionate one. Devising public policies and fostering private behaviour as part of a climate change policy should not be used as a pretext for advancing a closed conception of sustainability. Sustainability must encompass climate change, instead of climate change simply closing up sustainability. I would like to suggest that climate change's social dilemma resembles the one described by Blaise Pascal regarding God's existence. He famously reduced faith to a wager after considering the probabilities at stake. Pascal suggested that, although we cannot prove through reason that God exists, a person should bet on His existence, since living life accordingly one has everything to gain and nothing to lose, whereas, even more crucially, acting otherwise could mean losing everything and gaining eternal damnation (Pascal1995: 123-5). Likewise, we do know that temperatures are rising, although we do not know how will they evolve in the future, while there exists the possibility that humans are an active agent in that process and they can still influence on it. Thus two related possibilities become meaningless: that humans have nothing to do with the climate's evolution or that they cannot influence the current process anymore. They become meaningless because we must maximise our chances, that is, we must act as if advancing towards sustainability could mitigate global warming or at least facilitating the least damaging adaptation to its effects. No other wager makes sense. However, the need to act does not automatically indicate how to do so. Hence the public debate. We know that social engineering on a huge scale can fail miserably - as the twentieth century comes to show. Still, in the manner of a global insurance policy, a strategy for mitigation and adaptation is necessary. This strategy should be orientated to make possible the continuity, not the dismantling, of our current society. Neither a programme for ruralisation nor the low energy proposals aimed to scale back society into a network of self-sufficient communities are realistic (see Trainer 2010). They represent the comeback of green utopianism, although their usefulness in the debate of ideas should not be neglected: their defence of a radical transformation is necessary for achieving a moderate change. As Dyer writes: I like living in a high-energy civilisation, and I don't want to give it up. If it can be managed without causing a climate disaster, I would like everybody on the planet to live in wealthy societies that have the resources and the leisure to start looking after all citizens and not just the top dogs (Dyer 2008: 128). That is why climate change should "work for us", as Hulme and Neufeldt (2010) put it. It should be used for improving our societies through reform, not to pursue an unfeasible rupture based on a miraculous radical change in people's values (see Hourdequin 2010). It is more probable that people will follow a given virtuous inertia than to expect a sudden moral epiphany that clashes brutally with contemporary lifestyles - lifestyles that, despite the contempt that social science tends to show, people may well like. Therefore, in a nutshell, it is unlikely that citizens abandon their smartphones in order to embrace the charms of a more embedded rural life. It will simply not happen, cynical as it may sound. It also may sound Panglossian, since many today do not have enough money to acquire a telephone and the sources of dissatisfaction remain plentiful. It is in this connection that radical perspectives, namely, those wishing for some radical changes in the current sociopolitical organisation, are to be seen as the legitimate expression of unmet needs and desires deserving attention. This is true for global warming as it is true for other social problems. Yet we should not make mistakes when considering the sources of change. It is unlikely that the latter can be provoked by a sudden moral realisation on the part of relatively affluent citizens - it is more probable that a gradual evolution will take place, influenced by a multiplicity of factors, moral as well as economic and technological. On the other hand, a reformist and gradual approach to social change does not preclude the possibility that radical changes are the final outcome of an emergentist rather than a revolutionary process. Thus we should do the possible within the reasonable. But what does that mean? To begin with, it does not mean that the notion of sustainability presented so far has become invalidated. Unsurprisingly, classical environmentalists present climate change as the sudden and decisive proof that many old green positions happen to be right: nature is not abolished, human dominion of nature is not feasible, risks are everywhere. Therefore, we have been wrong and our worldview, together with our social organisation, must change. We cannot apply our old human solutions anymore: I am terrified by the hubris, the conceit, the arrogance implied by the words like "managing the planet' and 'stabilising the climate". ( ... ) Why are we, with our magnificent brains, so easily seduced by technocratic totalitarianism? (Tennekes in Hulme 2009: 312). However, we do not have any option other than trying to exert some degree of control over climate. After all, we find out what is going on with the climate because we try to exert such control (see Edwards 2010). Again, the latter should not be understood as a complete dominion, but rather as a sufficient, self-aware one. Mitigation policies are an attempt to influence climate - but I cannot see any arrogance in them. Furthermore, that we are able to discuss and devise strategies in the face of an abstract scientifically predicted threat should not be seen as a failure, but rather as a triumph of human reason. Similarly, the idea of an anthropogenic climate change does not demonstrate that nature has not ended, but rather comes to confirm in an unprecedented scale the merging of nature and society into the environment. As Leigh Glover puts it, "there is nothing natural left in the global atmosphere; humanity lives in and breathes an atmosphere that's an artifice of industrial activity and, consequently, the global climate is also now beyond nature" (Glover 2006: 254). If anything, climate change reinforces the case for a realistic sustainability. However, crucially, an advantage of climate change in this regard is that the kind of measures it demands - mitigation and adaptation in a wide scale should help to push the sustainability debate in the right direction. The reason is threefold. Firstly, climate change stresses by its very nature the issue of wellbeing and quality of life as much as that of pure survival. As the Hartwell Group (20 l 0) has underlined, climate change is not so much a problem to be solved, as a condition to live and cope with. Thus we should take advantage of the changes it demands in order to live better. That is, in healthier urban environments, in knowledge-based economies, with the best public education and health care for all (see Baker 2006: 3). Thus sustainability and well-being become linked. However, secondly, an adaptation based on the idea of well-being cannot succeed without economic growth. It is dubious that we can "manage without growth" (Victor 2008; see Jackson 2009), because tackling climate change and adapting to it is costly. Rich societies are better equipped to assimilate its impact than poor ones. As Nordhaus and Shellenberg note, environmentalism has always seen the economy as the cause rather than as the solution to ecological problems (Nordhaus and Shellenberg 2006). But, as a historic perspective shows, we can only be green while being rich. Neither the current understanding of economic growth nor the measurement of GDP for that reason should be exempt of criticism or amendment - changes can and ought to be made in order to reflect the environmental cost of economic activities. Yet the temptation to design people's well-being in a particular or detailed way should be avoided. It is rather a set of objective conditions of living under which subjective life-plans can be individually pursued that should be linked to climate change adaptation and hence to sustainability. For those conditions, which can be generally equated with the standards of current advanced societies, to be met, economic growth will remain necessary and desirable. Also because, thirdly, the idea that some sort of steady-state economy can be achieved and maintained is just a delusion. Sustainability must mirror the human condition: a dynamic type of development that by its very nature is open to further transformation (see Becker eta!. 1999: 6; Gallopin and Raskin 2002: 6). Although technological change and economic development can be orientated towards sustainability, it is wishful thinking to believe that they can just be stopped by decree. Governments must design markets and create the institutional conditions that eventually lead to a reasonable mitigation and to a successful adaptation, but they should do so without pre-determining a particular direction, although at the same time they must make sure that certain minimum targets are met (see Patt et a!. 20 10). It is all a matter of creating an institutional and economic inertia that pushes business and citizens in the direction of sustainability. To some extent, we live now in a transitional time. In fact, notwithstanding the key importance the institutional and economic drivers, it is probably the gradual cultural change induced by the current global debate on global warming that will accelerate the transition to a greener, yet liberal and open, society. In sum, the kind of approach that climate change demands coincides with the foundations of an open view of sustainability. That is why reframing environmentalism entails reframing climate change: freeing it from the rhetoric of doom and incorporating it into a narrative of social refinement. Certainly, saying that climate change should be seen as an opportunity instead of a threat sounds like a cliche. But it happens to be true - or, to be more accurate, it can be made true.

**Economic knowledge key to solve.**

Michael TOMAN RAND and adjunct faculty member, Nitze School of International Studies, Johns Hopkins University and Bren School of the Environment, University of California Santa Barbara. ‘6 Values in the Economics of Climate Change *Environmental Values* 15 p. 366

The role played by economic analysis of climate change in the IPCC and in other contexts is part of a broader effort that seeks to improve scientific understanding of climate change processes and their consequences in support of determining, in the spirit of Article 2 of the 1992 UN Climate Convention (UNFCCC 1999a), what constitutes ʻdangerous anthropogenic interferenceʼ with the climate system. Efforts to improve scientific understanding are important contributions to better decision making. However, such efforts can also mask deeper and more complex disagreements about social values. Neither science in general nor economics in particular can resolve the fundamentally moral issues posed by climate change. What scientific understanding, including economic understanding, can do is to help inform the definition and application of moral principles used for assessing the danger and developing public policy responses. To play this role in turn requires that the key assumptions and value judgments underlying the various analyses be understood. No less important is the clear understanding of the principles underlying various policy prescriptions themselves. Advocates for a wide range of views regarding the risks of climate change rely upon a variety of principles to justify prescriptive positions. The very diversity of these principles highlights the dif­ficulties encountered in establishing broader social agreement on what is needed and what should be done. In this context, advocates of economic analysis argue that its capacity to incorporate and compare a variety of costs and benefits makes it an important or even uniquely qualified tool. Critics of economic analysis of climate change have questioned not only its empirical capacities, but also its fundamental usefulness given some of the important but often implicit assump­tions and value judgments on which it is based. These value assumptions need to be more broadly understood in order to evaluate what economic analysis can and cannot contribute to understanding of climate change policy.1 But once these assumptions are understood, the ques­tion of how or if to use economics to assess climate change risks and policies remains. Some critics of economics seem also to be questioning the general usefulness of traditional scientific practices for climate change risk and policy assessment. One implication of this view is that a focus much more on the procedures of societal evaluation, information sharing and decision making is needed to advance morally acceptable and politically sustainable results. I think there is great merit in this. However, a relatively exclusive focus on the processes of societal dialogue and decisions in the belief that these will generate good answers seems to me as problematic as trying to rely primarily on technical analysis to justify a moral decision. Climate change is fraught with basic uncertainties; nonetheless, economics can contribute useful information to the debate on how to address the issue. To conclude the paper, I sketch and discuss an admittedly idealised process for integrating technical analysis and public give-and-take in the direction of climate change policy.

**Market incentives are change energy markets.**

Mark PENNINGTON Politics @ University of London ‘1Environmental Markets vs. Environmental Deliberation: A Hayekian Critique of Green Political Economy *New Political Economy* 6 (2) p. 181-184

Similar problems are evident in the unresolvable contradictions besetting the eco-anarchist44 and eco-socialist45 literatures, which for all their emphasis on ‘local participation’ favour some form of ‘strategic planning’ (usually in the guise of ‘democratic inter-community federations’) to ‘coordinate’ what might otherwise be a disparate and inconsistent set of local agendas. If complex inter-community relations are not to be coordinated through impersonal market forces then at some point recourse must be made to some central ‘coordinating’ authority—a position that would seem radically at odds with the supposed goal of ‘empowering’ local communities. It is, however, precisely this sort of central planning, which the Hayekian account and the actual experience of attempts at ‘integrated environmental policies’ suggest are prone to the severe epistemological difficulties discussed above. In markets, by contrast, the constant process of positive and negative feedback embodied in the structure of relative prices facilitates a process of mutual self-adjustment between people who never actually meet and cannot know in sufé cient detail the precise circumstances of others. None of the above is to suggest that no information can successfully be communicated via public discourse and debate. As Hayek repeatedly emphasised, language and discourse are also a form of spontaneous order and evolve without conscious social control.46 Moreover, deliberative democrats are surely right when they emphasise the coordinative signié cance of dialogue in many economic relationships .47 Gossip, for example, is often an important source of knowledge about new techniques, prices and production processes, as well as about the plans of competitors. As one Hayekian puts it, Market institution s are not the result of atomistic individuals responding to a given array of prices, but the result of individuals already involved in truly dialogical relationships . Trade journals, industry studies, marketing agreements, business lunches, conference calls, higgling and haggling, the interpretation of accounts and so forth are all part of the grand conversation of the market place.48 One might also add membership of environmental and religious groupings, the purchase of ‘lifestyle’ magazines, books and other spontaneous public fora, all of which transmit information verbally and provide a cultural/dialogical backdrop within which the market economy operates. Whilst recognising the signié cance of dialogical processes, what is fundamentally at issue from a Hayekian perspective is that there are important limits to the amount and type of information that can successfully be communicated in this way. Verbal knowledge communication in contexts such as business networks or the process of academic debate is effective in so far as it is focussed on a relatively narrow and circumscribed set of issues. In academia, for example, discursive knowledge transmission is possible because the terms of debate tend to be coné ned within what are fairly tight theoretical and disciplinary boundaries.49 Severe problems arise, however, when attempts to communicate knowledge and to coordinate decision making through discursive means are extended more widely to embrace more complex sets of issues. This is, however, precisely what Green deliberativists wish to pursue through the development of ‘holistic’ or ‘integrated’ environmental policies. Habermasian Greens such as Dryzek tend to see markets as abstract systems, which ‘get in the way’ or ‘subvert’ dialogical processes in some fundamental sense.50 From a Hayekian perspective, by contrast, market prices act as important ‘aids to the mind’, conveying otherwise inarticulable knowledge about economic relations in ways which allow for much wider, more complex communicative social relations than would be possible through purely discursive means. This very point appears to be accepted by Habermas himself, when he suggests that the complexity of modern systems would have to be sacrié ced if a completely democratic, dialogical model of social democracy were actually to be instituted. 51 For Habermas, a shift to an all-encompassing model of democratic participation at every level of decision making is incompatible with a complexly interrelated economic system—hence the call for social democrats to limit discursive decision procedures to the central ‘steering mechanisms’ of the political economy. It is far from clear, therefore, why markets should be regarded so sceptically by Greens and participatory socialists. If it is conceded that markets allow the development of much richer, more complex sets of social relations which extend the scope for communicative rationality beyond discursive means, then why should they not be utilised to facilitate the development of this rationality to the fullest possible degree? As Prychitko puts it, ‘why should a restricted dialogue, one which is not allowed the full play to yield market prices, be thought of as the more rational mechanism with which to conduct economic activity?’52 It is this propensity for the institution s advocated by Green theorists actually to reduce information è ows and hence thwart the desired process of intersubjective learning, which provides the critical element in the Hayekian case against an over-reliance on deliberative democracy. At the core of Hayek’s critique of government planning is his emphasis on the signié cance of tacit knowledge. This refers to time-and place-specié c information that cannot be articulated in verbal form. Much of this information is inherently private in character—knowledge of the phenomenal pictures that exist within the individual mind and which no one else discerns. Tacit knowledge of this species is epitomised in a person or group of persons ‘being in the right place at the right time’, exhibiting ‘è air and intuition’ or ‘knowing a particular market’ and constitutes the essence of creative entrepreneurship.53 Faced with the same set of ‘facts’ some individuals will perceive creative opportunities , where others see nothing. According to Hayek, individuals are best able to deploy tacit knowledge for social good, when they are the least constrained by collective/majoritarian decision procedures in which this knowledge is likely to be diluted or lost. Of course, collective forms of decision abound in all aspects of life—in company boardrooms, for example. What is crucial, however, is that there are clear lines of responsibility linking decisions and the relevant knowledge to specié c individuals /groups, so that people have a clear feedback mechanism to learn about the quality of their own decisions and knowledge. Private property rights and the account of proé t and loss provide such a link and hence facilitate social learning. In addition, property rights afford space to try out eccentric and innovative ideas, the merits/demerits of which people occupying other phenomenal spaces cannot discern. Knowledge of this sort cannot be communicated by verbal means, but is only revealed through action. It is only when private projects are put into practice that the relevant information is revealed. A learning process may then be set in motion as previously indiscernible successes are imitated and previously indiscernible errors can be avoided.54 The detrimental environmental effects which can follow from the inability of collectivist institution s to communicate knowledge effectively are well illustrated by the often, perverse results which have resulted from the introduction of environmental controls on ‘moral’ grounds. Consider regulations, often favoured by Greens, which mandate a specié ed proportion of recycled materials in various products. In many instances such controls have actually led to worse environmental outcomes, because the é nished products have turned out to be of a poorer quality (inadequate strength, for example). As a consequence, producers have responded by raising inputs (though not the proportion) of non-recycled elements in order to maintain product standards. The result has been the production of goods which use more total inputs than might otherwise have been the case.55 References to the signié cance of tacit knowledge by deliberative democrats are particularly surprising, since by deé nition much of the relevant information cannot be communicated linguistically . If people are consistently allowed to veto the exercise of private property rights through majoritarian democracy and an ‘extension of the public sphere’, then the relevant discovery process may be thwarted as the range of possible plans that may be implemented is reduced. Equally, the extension of third party decision rights to actors who are not themselves held é nancially responsible for their actions blurs the lines of responsibility linking the use of knowledge to outcomes and hence may inhibit social learning. The greater the extension of social democratic controls over property rights, the more difé cult it becomes to judge which particular bits of knowledge are appropriate to the tasks in hand. In general, it is much easier to generate clear feedback signals and to assess cause/effect relationships in a market context, such as the link between product quality and a particular producer, than to link the quality of complex social outcomes to public policy decisions. The repeated emphasis on the importance of ‘consensus building’ by the Habermasian Greens is also problematic from a Hayekian point of view.56 If no new actions are to be allowed to proceed until there is a majoritarian consensus (a major feat in itself given the difé culties of securing consensus even in small group settings such as the running of academic departments or company boardrooms), then innovation and entrepreneurship are likely to be thwarted. The essence of creative entrepreneurship in the economy and other contexts such as science is to break with the consensus position. For all the emphasis on the importance of diversity and localism by deliberativists , it is hard to see how such diversity would be possible if majoritarian consensus is the primary decision rule. There comes a point, therefore, where the use of the ‘voice’ mechanisms that characterise collective decision procedures need to be backed up by the ‘exit’ mechanisms that are more evident in private markets.57 It is the epistemological significance of exit and competition that is completely missed by most Green theorists, who equate the case for markets with a worldview that posits selfish egoists ruthlessly seeking to destroy the opposition in a Hobbesian jungle.58 Seen from this perspective, competition is the antithesis of the other regarding, cooperative values considered essential for the advancement of a more ecologically sensitive age. From a Hayekian perspective, by contrast, competition is not antithetical to cooperative endeavour—even in a world of perfect altruism, market competition would be necessary on purely epistemologica l grounds. One might even argue that markets would work more effectively if people actually were altruistic—no need to worry about free-riders!59 In a world of uncertainty and diffuse, imperfect knowledge, what the market process involves is competition between different types of cooperation, allowing social experimentation and a discovery process to unfold that can reveal which particular ways of organising production and consumption work best. It is precisely this process of entrepreneurial experimentation and discovery which is thwarted by attempts to force supposedly ‘cooperative’ endeavours into a single plan. From a Hayekian perspective, the market economy does not act to maximise or optimise anything or to fulé l a single hierarchy of ends.60 Rather, it facilitates an open-ended process of experimentation to discover both ends and means in an uncertain world, where it is difé cult enough for people to comprehend their own interests, let alone the ‘public interest’. Market competition (i.e. competition in persuasion) provides a forum for experimentation, fosters mutual awareness between individuals who may never actually meet—through the generation of prices—and hence enables a degree of coordination between people with disparate and perhaps inconsisten t plans. The market process, therefore, acts as a form of ‘surrogate debate’ that, for the epistemologica l reasons discussed earlier, facilitates a wider range of options to be tried and tested than might ever be achieved through the processes of formal political communication.61 In the light of the above, the traditional concerns of both Greens and the left over excessive inequality and unequal ‘power relations’ may be better addressed through redistributive taxation, rather than attempts to restrict private property rights and transform the process of decision making itself along social democratic lines. In this way, greater equality in material resources would allow the subjective values of those individual s with previously low incomes to be given greater weight in an otherwise unregulated market.

**Sustainable technology development to solve climate change is the best common ground.**

Chris **SNEDDON** Geography @ Dartmouth **ET AL** **‘6** “Sustainable development in a Post-Brundtland World” *Ecological Economics* 57 p. 259-263 [acronyms clarified – Turner]

Mainstream SD has proceeded apace since the advent of the Brundtland Report. While the risk of cooptation and abuse of SD, often entailing a watering down of its more radical prescriptions for enhancing sustainability, has been repeatedly noted (see Le´le´, 1991; Luke, 1995; Sneddon, 2000; Fernando, 2003), the concept is now firmly entrenched within many government offices, corporate boardrooms, and the hallways of international NGOs and financial institutions. At the very least, the staying power of SD can be explained by its propensity for providing some common ground for discussion among a range of developmental and environmental actors who are frequently at odds (Pezzoli, 1997). Its strongest boosters–for example, those in international environmental NGOs and intergovernmental agencies– thus feel fairly comfortable advancing a concept that is most effective in bringing former adversaries to the table even while accomplishing precious little in the way of concrete outcomes. Supporters of SD at these levels continue to advocate reform of existing institutions to better accommodate SD principles. Conversely, critics of the mainstream position advocate more radical societal changes, and have comprehensively and incisively deconstructed SD’s [sustainable development’s] basic contradictions (e.g., Redclift, 1987; J. O’Connor, 1994) and its power-laden, problematic assumptions (e.g., Escobar, 1995). However, they have left little more than ashes in its place. We can agree with Escobar, that the bBrundtland Report, and much of the sustainable development discourse, is a tale that a disenchanted (modern) world tells itself about its sad condition (Escobar, 1996, pp. 53–54). At the same time, we argue as well for a resurrection of SD into a more conceptually potent and politically effective set of ideas and practices that comprise an empowering tale. We advocate a middle and pragmatic path, one that takes seriously calls for radical changes in our ideas and institutions dealing with sustainable development, while also holding out the possibility that genuine reform of current institutions may be possible. Partial reform may pre-empt necessary radical change, but it may also make it easier in the future7. Our first intervention is to declare a truce among the epistemological and methodological schisms that separate the defenders of sustainable development from critics of the concept. For its advocates–identified most closely with development practitioners situated in a variety of United Nations offices (e.g., Untied Nations Development Program), government agencies (e.g., ministries and departments of natural resources and environment), and corporate boardrooms (e.g., the Business Council for Sustainable Development)–sustainable development as laid out by the WCED (broadly) remains the most tenable principle of collective action for resolving the twin crises of environment and development. For many academics–particularly those associated with ecological economics and related fields (see Soderbaum, 2000; Daly and Farley, 2004)–sustainable development offers an attractive, perhaps the only, alternative to conventional growth-oriented development thinking. However, for some of its socio-cultural critics (e.g., Escobar, 1995; Sachs, 1999; Fernando, 2003), mainstream SD is a ruse, yet another attempt to discount the aspirations and needs of marginalized populations across the planet in the name of green development. Other critics, while broadly sympathetic towards its goals, point out SD’s fundamental lack of attention to the powerful political and economic structures of the international system that constrain and shape even the most well-intentioned policies (e.g., Redclift, 1987, 1997)8. For critics grounded in the ecological sciences (e.g., Frazier, 1997; Dawe and Ryan, 2003), SD is unforgivably anthropocentric and thus unable to dissolve the false barriers between the human sphere of economic and social activities and the ecological sphere that sustains these activities9. These divisions reflect more than simply different value positions and attendant political goals. Proponents of a mainstream version of SD tend to see knowledge production (epistemology) and research design (methodology) in very specific terms. At the risk of caricature, this position demonstrates tendencies towards individualism, economism and technological optimism in assessing how knowledge about the social world is brought into being (Faber et al., 2002; Robinson, 2004). SD advocates also place a great deal of faith in quantitative representations of complex human-environment relations, in part because of a desire to present generalizable knowledge to policy makers. Conversely, critics of SD are for the most part social constructivist in perspective, arguing that knowledge of the world always represents a series of mediations among human social relations and individual identities (see Robinson, 2004, pp. 379–380; Demeritt, 2002). Critics are also more apt to stress the historical contingency of development processes, and undertake qualitative studies grounded in a case study methodology. Perhaps most importantly, while advocates of a conventional SD continue to perceive the policy process as a genuine pathway towards reform, critics have largely given up on state-dominated institutions as a means of change. Despite these substantial differences in perspective, our intimation is that both advocates and critics would agree that a socially just and ecologically sustainable world, or even an approximation, would be a desirable end. 3.2. Embracing pluralism: ecological economics, political ecology and freedom-oriented development We argue that we can move beyond the ideological and epistemological straightjackets that deter more cohesive and politically effective interpretations of SD, in order to operationalize the aforementioned truce, by embracing pluralism. We argue that ecological economics, as an explicitly transdisciplinary enterprise, in tandem with political ecology, freedom oriented development, and deliberative democracy, offer important means for advancing our understandings of the local–global politics of sustainability. Recent discussions within ecological economics have highlighted the need for the field to expand its methodological and epistemological purview (Gale, 1998; Peterson, 2000; Nelson, 2001; Muradian and MartinezAlier, 2001; Martinez-Alier, 2002) to engage more directly with a wide variety of non-academic political actors (Meppem, 2000; Shi, 2004; Norgaard, 2004) and to confront its future direction as either a more specialized, if somewhat narrow normal science or a more integrative, creative bpost-normalQ science (Mu ller, 2003). Ecological economics has also introduced a series of innovative methodological approaches for interpreting and assessing sustainability. Some of these include calculations of intergenerational equity (Howarth, 1997, 2003; Padilla, 2002), differentiations of bweakQ versus bstrongQ sustainability (in essence debates over the substitutability of ecosystem-derived resources) (Norton and Toman, 1997; Neumayer, 2003), the valuation of ecosystem services (Costanza et al., 1997; Spash, 2000), broadening our interpretation of environmental bvaluesQ (Bukett, 2003) and the burgeoning work on sustainability indicators (e.g., Bell and Morse, 1999). Taken as a whole, ecological economics may be understood as an attempt to refine and implement the broad vision of SD advanced by Brundtland. It has done so, largely thus far, by providing a bridge between economics and ecology (see Norton and Toman, 1997). We contend that additional bridges need further development. For example, the role of power, from local to global scales, needs to be more consistently incorporated into ecological economics. The analysis of power relationships is a central concern of political ecology, particularly power as expressed through the discourse and practices of multiple actors (including households, nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], social movements, communities, capitalist enterprises, and state agents and institutional networks) who cooperate and come into conflict over specific development projects or other state-and market-mediated activities (Peluso and Watts, 2001, p. 25). Key contributors to political ecology including Joan Martinez-Alier (2002), Martin O’Connor (1994a,b), and Ramachandra Guha (Guha and Martinez-Alier, 1999; Guha, 2000) have provided leadership and intellectual fuel to ecological economics, yet the vast majority of articles in the journal Ecological Economics do not address the social and ecological implications of power relations. The field of political ecology has also attracted an array of anthropologists, geographers, environmental historians and associated social scientists united by efforts to clarify the ways in which resource degradation and conflicts are derived from particular political and economic processes (Emel and Peet, 1989). Political ecologists also stress the need to take seriously recent insights from ecological theory, particularly those associated with nonlinearity and complexity (Zimmerer, 1994), and undertake research that seeks to link a rigorous characterization of ecological transformation to the local, national and global processes (cultural, political– economic) that are driving such changes (see Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). The result has been a series of case studies–mostly but not exclusively focused on third-world contexts (see McCarthy, 2001; Walker, 2003)–detailing the varying ways that environmental conflicts (over forests, water, fisheries, agroecosystems, biodiversity and other socioecological entities) are constituted through struggles over access to resources and the benefits accruing from resource exploitation (Peluso, 1992; Bryant and Bailey, 1997). Additionally, both ecological economics and political ecology have offered potent critiques of development theory and practice (see M. O’Connor, 1994a; Peet and Watts, 1996). At a general level, these are by now well-rehearsed. Indeed, anti-development narratives have progressed to the point where a fairly welldefined field–post-development studies–is emergent (see Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997). In spite of, and in some ways because of, the numerous and varied deconstructions of ddevelopmentT (see Ekins and Max-Neef, 1992; Crush, 1995; Sachs et al., 1998), we argue that the linkage of dsustainabilityT with the vilified concept of ddevelopmentT need not be the death-knell of sustainable development that many have taken it to be. Again, in the interests of reconstructing the conceptual landscape of sustainable development, we argue that some politically savvy and ethically defensible semblance of development is salvageable. And a useful place to start is found in the work of Amartya Sen (1999). Development as Freedom is an incisive and comprehensive analysis of the myriad ways in which economic and social debates about bdevelopmentQ have failed to struggle with fundamental issues regarding ethics, human rights and individual freedoms. These are issues that concerned the political economists of the 18th and 19th centuries. Recovering these concerns, Sen uses freedom as a lens to interrogate the traditional foci of development studies and practice such as poverty, food production, women’s role in development, market versus state institutions, welfare and culture. We contend that Sen’s approach peels back a great deal of the posturing, reification and instrumentalism found in the development literature. It does so by making the normative claim that development is ultimately about freedom (e.g., political rights and responsibilities, economic and social opportunities, transparency guarantees in social interactions), in contrast to a narrowly defined yet widely adopted identification of development with aggregate economic growth. If there is one noticeable gap in Sen’s analysis, it is a lack of concern with the environment and ecological changes. One of Sen’s most important contributions is the way he uses a freedom-based understanding of development to confront narrower versions focused solely on aggregate levels of economic growth. In a related work, Anand and Sen (2000; see also Brekke and Howarth, 2002) provide a trenchant critique of what they call the opulence-oriented approach to development10. As they put it, the bfundamental difficulty with the approach of wealth maximization and with the tradition of judging success by overall opulence of a society is a deep-seated failure to come to terms with the universalist unbiasedness needed for an adequate understanding of social justice and human developmentQ (Anand and Sen, 2000, p. 2031). In Sen we can begin to see a way to radically alter the general orientation of development, away from its obsession with an aggregate, ill-defined wealth towards a rigorously defined notion of freedom that builds on ideals of social justice and human dignity. Taken together, the three approaches sketched above offer a wide range of methodologies, normative positions, and ways of understanding human-environment relations from which to approach sustainable development discourses and practices in the postBrundtland era. Table 1 summarizes the contributions of these approaches to a pluralistic, transdisciplinary strategy for confronting sustainability11. We argue that such an approach can begin a conversation about critical aspects of sustainability that hitherto have been overlooked in the numerous debates about the subject. It is our sense that the normative underpinnings of sustainable development (e.g., ethical commitments across generations, development as enhanced freedoms) and the political programs that might follow have received some treatment in the context of SD debates, but have never been satisfactorily used together. It is our hope that the socio-theoretical and normative tools sketched above be used to (1) continue the ongoing interrogation of sustainable development as a policy discourse and development practice, and (2) reconstruct a normative vision of sustainable development that is simultaneously attuned to the danger of cooptation on the part of powerful actors hoping to give unsustainable activities a bsustainableQ veneer and the need for a sustainability politics that transcends calls for the overhaul of everything. In a postBrundtland world, decisions over environmental governance (e.g., the deployment of ecologically deleterious technologies, economic development pathways and human consumption patterns) are a function of both fragmenting and integrating forces occurring at multiple scales. Our vision of pluralistic sustainability research and praxis calls for recognition of the inherently political nature of the conflicts that arise from such forces, for example, over Third World states’ desire to construct massive hydroelectric schemes or industrialized countries’ relative inaction on climate change. Advocates of sustainable development might wrestle with these conflicts in any number of ways–by inserting oneself as facilitator, advocate or witness into discussions over specific projects, or by researching and calling for a decision-making process that incorporates multiple perspectives–but it is our sense that this is how we must proceed for any advancement of SD policies and politics.

**Shifting consumption cannot solve.**

Blake **ALCOTT** Ecological Economist Masters from Cambridge in Land Economy ‘**8** The sufficiency strategy: Would rich-world frugality lower environmental impact? *Ecological Economics* 64 (4) p. Science Direct

The environmental sufficiency strategy of greater consumer frugality has become popular in ecological economics, its attractiveness increasing along with awareness that not much can be done to stem population growth and that energy-efficiency measures are either not enough or, due to backfire, part of the problem. Concerning the strategy's feasibility, effectiveness, and common rationale, several conclusions can be drawn. • The consequences of the strategy's frugality demand shift – price reduction and the ensuing consumption rebound – are not yet part of mainstream discussion. • Contrary to what is implied by the strategy's advocates, the frugality shift cannot achieve a one-to-one reduction in world aggregate consumption or impact: Poorer marginal consumers increase their consumption. • The size of the sufficiency rebound is an open question. • The concepts of ‘North’ and ‘South’ are not relevant to the consumption discussion. • Even if the voluntary material consumption cuts by the rich would effect some lowering of total world consumption, changing human behaviour through argument and exhortation is exceedingly difficult. • While our moral concern for present others is stronger than that for future others, this intragenerational equity is in no way incompatible with non-sustainable impact. • Since savings effected by any one country or individual can be (more than) compensated by other countries and individuals, the relevant scale of any strategy is the world. • No single strategy to change any given right-side factor in I = f(P,A,T) guarantees any effect on impact whatsoever. • Right-side strategies in combination are conceptually complicated and perhaps more costly than explicitly political left-side strategies directly lowering impact. • Research emphasis should be shifted towards measures to directly lower impact both in terms of depletion and emissions. Lower consumption may have advantages on the individual, community, or regional level. There is for instance some truth in the view of Diogenes that happiness and quantity of consumption do not necessarily rise proportionally. Living lightly can offer not only less stress and more free time but also the personal boon of a better sense of integrity, fulfilling the Kantian criterion that one’s acts should be possible universally (worldwide). Locally it could mean cleaner air, less acid rain, less noise, less garbage, and more free space. And in the form of explicit, guaranteed shifts of purchasing power to poorer people it would enable others to eat better or to buy goods such as petrol and cars. However, given global markets and marginal consumers, one person’s doing without enables another to ‘do with’: In the near run the former consumption of a newly sufficient person can get fully replaced. And given the extent of poverty and the temptations of luxury and prestige consumption, this near run is likely to be longer than the time horizon required for a relevant strategy to stem climate change and the loss of vital species and natural resources.

**Puplic opinion and polling data proves.**

**Patchen, 6**—Professor Emeritus of Sociology at Purdue University, taught Social Psychology for many years, first at the University of Michigan and then at Purdue University. He has studied attitudes and behavior in a variety of settings, including workplaces, schools, and the public arena. He is the author of seven books and numerous journal articles (Martin, “Public Attitudes and Behavior about Climate Change: What Shapes Them and How to Influence Them,” Purdue Climate Change Research Center, October 2006)

Changing Lifestyles

Many environmentalists believe that, in order to avoid or at least reduce climate change, we need to change our lifestyles – to drive less, use less electric power, and generally live more simply. Are most people willing to do this? The answer seems to be yes, but only to a **modest extent**. For example, the study by Kempton and his colleagues found that most people (among sawmill workers, dry cleaners, and the general public, as well as environmentalists) agreed that “Americans are going to have to drastically reduce their level of consumption over the next few years.” On the other hand, majorities in most of these groups (including those in the Sierra Club) said that, “We don’t have to reduce our standard of living to solve global climate change or other environmental problems.” Apparently most people thought that we can reduce our consumption without changing our standard of living.61

A recent national survey found that, among Americans who believe there is solid evidence of global warming, only a minority – though a substantial minority (29%) – think that we will have to make major sacrifices to solve the problem.62 Actually, most Americans think that taking steps to combat climate change will bring positive benefits eventually. In another recent survey, 71 per cent endorsed a statement that steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions will help the U.S. economy to “become more competitive…in the long run”.63

Some recent surveys in the U.S. and in Britain indicate that most people are willing to make some small financial sacrifices in order to reduce greenhouse gas emissions – such as paying slightly more for energy (U.S.)64 or paying several hundred dollars o make their homes more energy efficient, even if this brought them no cost saving (Britain)65.

But after reviewing surveys in the United States and other countries, Bord and his colleagues state, “Although surveys…almost overwhelmingly indicate willingness to pay and sacrifice for environmental goals, this support has **limits**.”66 They point, for example, to the reluctance of most people to reduce their driving or to pay higher costs for gasoline. They conclude, “Our interpretation of existing data is that, all things being equal, a majority of citizens in most countries will support national and international initiatives designed to cope with global warming as long as these initiatives do not demand a significant alteration of lifestyle.”67

### Survival O/W

#### Survival outweighs – different values and forms of life necessary to sustainability so we shouldn’t privilege ethics over existence.

Marcel **WISSENBURG** Political Theory @ Radboud University (Nijmegen Netherlands) **‘6** “Ecological Neutrality and Liberal Survivalism” *Analyse & Kritik* 28 p. 141-144

One could then argue that even though ecologists may agree on what they want to achieve (let us at least assume that much), they cannot agree in advance on how to achieve it, for the simple reason that more research is needed. Laboratory experiments only get us so far; countless permutations and combinations of technologies, resources and lifestyles will have to be tested in practice, in real life and real environments, simply because the success of any solution for unsustainability is unpredictable. This is where the precautionary principle, one of the few procedural principles most ecologists appear to support, comes into play. It would be imprudent, not to say contrary to any interpretation of the precautionary principle, to prescribe one lifestyle for all humans living under unimaginably different circumstances, i. e., to put all one’s eggs in one basket, or even to create social environments in which some lifestyles are wilfully obstructed. The result could be unforeseen local or global exhaustion of resources, civilization reaching a dead end, new and greener technologies and ways of life remaining undiscovered. Prescribing an appropriate lifestyle instead, one that is ‘in tune’ (in harmony) with a particular group’s natural environment, may appear to be a more sensible solution, but it only gets us halfway there—wherever ‘there’ may be. Misanthropic as the observation may be, many of the darker ecologists have argued that humans have never ever led sustainable lives, and if they did once, all knowledge of it has disappeared. In other words, giving scientific uncertainty its due role, if we do not know what a sustainable life ought to be like for all humans, we do not know what it ought to be like for any particular subset; we could easily face the same results as when prescribing one lifestyle for all. Since laboratory settings and drawing table plans can only be of limited help, the road to sustainability may be one encouraging diversity, bold experiments challenging orthodox views (from space travel to dishwashers), and trial and error. From here, it is only a small step towards accepting an ecological principle of neutrality with regard to lifestyles and social and natural environments (together: life environments), the Life Environment Principle: “There is to be a maximum set of life environments compatible with a similar set for others.” (see Wissenburg 2007 for further interpretations of this principle) Having rid ourselves of the misconception that substantive ecological goals necessarily imply one road to salvation only, or even many roads as long as they do not involve a conception of neutrality, it is now time to look more closely at the liberal conception of neutrality. In the 17th and 18th Century, liberalism contained no such principle as “all theories of the good deserve equal respect”; there was no room for the modern liberal notion of neutrality there. Females, primitives, peasants and atheists were never part of the original liberal plan. Liberals were tolerant and promoted tolerance, but tolerance was almost exclusively limited to different religions (or even only some sects within Christendom) and the moralities to which they gave rise. Overarching ‘all’ different moralities was one final touchstone: natural law. First stretched up to legitimize libertine sexual practices and finally blown to bits by De Sade’s insistence that anything goes that natural law allows, 19th Century liberals like Mill and Green replaced natural law by a perfectionist belief in pluralism as the road to the good life. Although no explicit standards for ‘the best way of life’ were given, the assumption was clearly that some ways of life were better than others, that discovering the better way(s) of life was a matter of experimentation, and that some could even be excluded beforehand—although it has never become clear if pushpin, being an obviously less worthy activity than poetry, belonged to the latter class. It is only in parts of 20th Century liberalism that we can find supporters for the idea that governments should be scrupulously neutral with regard to real-existing and irreducible moral pluralism, i. e., liberals who have given up all hope of moral perfection. In other words, neutrality is not a core value of liberalism, though perhaps tolerance towards reasonably defensible disagreement on foundational principles is. Although liberalism has then, apparently, given up on its belief that the laws of nature include natural laws (i. e., moral laws), it has never rejected the notion of laws of nature (i. e., physics) demarcating the realm of human possibilities. Nor has it given up belief that physical laws do and moral principles should apply equally to all: if I have a right to X by virtue of property Y, and you also have property Y, then, other things being equal, you have an equal right to X. This one natural law left over has always (although not always consistently) served as a restraint on individual acquisition, excluding first violence and murder except when in self-defence, then slavery and the subjection of women, next aspects of pornography and educational indoctrination—all reflected in John Rawls’ First Principle. At this point, we meet a fork in the road. In one direction, we find a typically social liberal a priori argument for nature conservation. The other is more in line with classical liberalism, i. e., John Locke’s defence of the right to private property, requiring real need and sufficient remaining stock as justifications, combined with John Stuart Mill’s harm principle. The social liberal road leads us to the notion of equal opportunity. Where Rawls (1973) criticized Napoleonic equal opportunity as unfair since it made careers open to all but did not guarantee equal education prior to entering the career path, Rawls himself can in turn be criticized for promising equal starting positions (fair equality of opportunity) but not delivering. As conscious as social liberals have always been to educational, social and economic inequality as factors inhibiting an equal start in life, as unmindful have they remained of environmental factors with the same effect—even though one’s birth place is as undeserved as one’s talents or one’s parents’ class. While he himself kept rejecting cosmopolitan liberalism, the later Rawls (1999) did affirm that participation in a just international society is possible only for relatively affluent societies; on them rests a moral obligation (a ‘natural duty’, Rawls (1973) would say) to remove economically and environmentally challenged societies from that state. The same line of reasoning might be used to support the thesis that any society has an obligation to ensure that its members live under conditions of relative scarcity rather than absolute poverty, i. e., that they have sufficient resources to survive in the first place. An alternative route to survival as the primary concern of liberals leads through possessive or classical liberalism. In a way, liberalism has become more and more restrictive over the centuries, excluding more and more ways of life and lifestyles as unjustifiable obstructions to equal liberty, in turn regardless of the goal served by liberty: some lifestyles are straightforward morally repugnant (raping), some are so indirectly by seizing a, by law of nature, scarce good (looting). Just like no human can claim the exclusive right to rule all others any more than any other, no human can (mutatis mutandis) claim the exclusive right to a scarce resource any more than anyone else. In other words: environmental factors limit all systems of human liberty. From here, using Locke’s provisos, it is only a small step towards acknowledging that, first, no human can claim, more than any other, the exclusive right to the use, possession or ownership of nature in any way in which it can be interpreted as a resource; and then to the principle that no part or aspect of nature may be used by any one individual unless an argument can be given that trumps all others against that individual’s using it. Given the fact that nature can always be interpreted in some way as a scarce resource, the only argument that cannot be trumped (although it can be met on equal terms) would be survival. Both roads lead to the same conclusion: survival trumps everything. Without the necessary natural (and social) resources to survive, diversity of lifestyle, autonomy, choice and justice become fantasies; where resources are finite, no individual’s life of luxury can be justified unless ‘enough and as good’ was left for others to survive on, or unless the worst-off had their fair share in natural resources enabling them not just an equal start, but simply the ability to start. Hence, liberalism’s appreciation of moral pluralism combined with the recognition not only in theory but also in practice that the means to realize different views of the good life are limited could become a survivalist theory, a theory in which diversity in lifestyle is permissible only when survival is guaranteed first. The exact meaning of the crucial term “survival” is of course open to debate. From a libertarian point of view, it can be read as a Lockean proviso for those resources needed to breathe, move and procreate (food, water and air in whatever form). Social liberals will indubitably be divided on the exact border between basic needs and further wants, with many arguing that survival equals a life worth living in a given social context, hence some degree of positive liberty: the availability of the best possible (and most expensive) health care in one place, the prohibition of SUVs elsewhere. What matters is not that survival is a controversial or essentially contested concept, what matters is that at the level of principles, survival may come to precede just distribution—in Rawls’ (1973) terms, that a general conception of justice may be more often considered fitting than a special conception, and that more and more often the condition of relative scarcity, required to successfully apply the concept of justice in the first place, may not be judged to have been met at all.

#### Reducing consumption worst for billions dependent on high levels of global demand. It’s too complicated to reduce consumption without economic disaster.

Rasmus **KARLSSON** Poli Sci @ Lund **‘9** “A global Fordian compromise?—And what it would mean

for the transition to sustainability” *Envt’l Science and Policy*  12 p. 191

Yet, this does not take away the impression that other environmental problems, and then especially global climate change, are not prone to go away that easily. In fact, climate change may turn out to be the ‘‘perfect moral storm’’ (Gardiner, 2006) as it causes and effects are transboundary, intergenerational and highly varied across time and space. Unlike CFCs that were fairly easy to substitute, the use of carbon based fuels are ubiquitous, even up to the point when it can be considered the very propellant of the modern industrial civilization. This combination of immense collective action problems (Andreou, 2006) and our profound dependence of fossil fuels clearly put limits on traditional green politics. Yet, it also helps explaining why Greens, during the last decade, so unanimously have identified climate change as being the environmental issue. For radical Greens, the transition to a post-carbon society means nothing less than the very dismantling of the global consumer society, a return to small self-sufficient communities and with them a life thought to be both more democratic and authentic. For moderate Greens, the same transition is a way of not only avoiding dangerous climate change but also indirectly solving a range of other environmental problems such as acidification and toxification since these often are closely related to the burning of fossil fuels. Both groups offer grim projections of what the future will be like if we fail to take action (Kolbert, 2006; Linden, 2006; Lynas, 2007). The coming catastrophes of climate change are thought to include economic downfall, lethal heat waves and massive loss of human life. What is perplexing is that many, if not all, of these future calamities are already happening today in Africa and other parts of the developing world. Given that most environmental ethicists subscribe to highly universalistic morals this may point towards a kind of cognitive dissonance by which potential human suffering in the future appears more urgent than actual human suffering today. But beyond that dissonance, and the accompanying easy rhetorical point, lies a much darker landscape of hopelessness. Without the prospect of advanced technological paths to sustainability, and here we have to remember that Greens traditionally have been highly sceptical of big science, the sustainable transition would have to imply a dramatic reduction in human consumption and thus in global economic demand. To put it somewhat bluntly, ‘‘the path of reconciliation with the Third World might consist in our becoming Third World ourselves’’ (Bahro, 1996, p. 88). Taking this provocative statement as a starting point, I will now turn my attention to three different problems related to the anatomy of such a possible future reduction. 2.1. Unintended consequences Witnessing how the subprime mortgage fallout has spread around the world over the last year, it is easy to see that not only is the world economic system highly interdependent, its foundations may also be somewhat shakier than commonly understood. The very capitalistic system as we know it (with stock markets, interest rates and government treasury bonds) is built around the single premise of long-term economic growth. Any politically motivated reduction in consumption, especially of the more dramatic kind envisaged by radical Greens, is likely to have numerous and probably even disastrous consequences for the world economy. Unfair as the current terms of trade may be, the livelihood of billions of people depend on that there is a global demand for textiles, food and a whole range of other consumer goods. Only if very carefully orchestrated can that demand be scaled back piece by piece, yet Arne Næss is not alone in arguing, ‘‘the longer we wait the more drastic will be the measures needed’’ (Næss, 1989, p. 31). Most likely, any such urgency would come at a high human toll. Remembering how notoriously difficult it was to plan the economy from above in the communist countries (Ericson, 2006), dismantling global chains of commerce appears to be like a gigantic Mikado game in which we cannot easily tell what should go first. It is not certain that what appears as the luxury of some is not intricately connected to the provision of the daily bread of others.

## \*\*\* 2NC

### AT: No Link – Plan is Negative Action

#### 3. Avoid action to achieve results even if it opposes other anti-Taoist action

Kirkland 98 [Russell Kirkland, Associate Professor of Religion (and Asian Studies), “"Responsible Non-Action" In a Natural World: Perspectives from the Nei-Yeh, Chuang-Tzu, and Tao-Te Ching,” 1998, University of Georgia, http://kirkland.myweb.uga.edu/rk/pdf/pubs/ECO.pdf]

From the perspective of the texts of ancient Taoism, all such assumptions are patently absurd, and reflect nothing more than the perpetual human glorification of itself. Some misinterpreters of Taoism happily assume that the only human intervention that is deleterious is "their" intervention, never "my" intervention. That is, the interventional activity of a construction crew building a dam on a river is regarded as an unwarranted imposition upon nature; but the interventional activity of a legistor or protest group intended to stop the building of the dam is somehow regarded as not being interventional activity at all. The interventional activity of the "enlightened" and "compassionate" hero is defined away in a self-serving defense of egotistical activity. If we recognize the ancient Chinese term wei as denoting "human action intended to achieve results," then it necessarily follows that action intended to stop the construction of a dam, the draining of a wetland, or the burning of a rain-forest is precisely such action. The only difference is that the developers and their opponents desire different results. And as everyone seems to know, the view of the ancient Taoists is that "human action intended to achieve results" is **contrary to the Tao**, whatever the motivation for such action. So is the Taoist perspective on life that we ought to stop caring about the state of the world? The answer to that question is both yes and no. And in trying to understand those answers, we must be careful to remember the ancient Taoist assumptions about life, which are in certain basic ways utterly alien to all modern assumptions. In relation to the baby floating down the river, the true Taoist answer is not the answer provided by the student whom I quoted. Chuang-tzu would sit and watch the baby float down the river, I contend, not because Mencius would already have jumped in to save the threatened child. Such an answer would be false because it assumes: (1) that the possible death of the child can and must be assumed to be a bad thing, and (2) that human interventional action is actually proper and necessary to prevent catastrophes from occurring to innocent, helpless living things. Neither of those assumptions would be in accord with the contents of the Tao te ching, Chuang-tzu, or Nei-yeh. From the perspective of ancient Taoists, there is no way to know whether any given event is "good" or "bad," for human ability to comprehend the processes of life is grossly fallible and often tragically mistaken. The results of our incomprehension of life is that we frequently take well intentioned actions that are meant to achieve good results, but generally lead to results that are actually not good at all. From the Taoist perspective, it therefore follows that the only good actions are actions that are not taken, and the only good people are the people who are thoughtful enough, considerate enough, humble enough, and brave enough not to take any interventional action at all. From the Taoist perspective, I shall argue, it is only such people who can truly be regarded as enlightened and morally responsible. The basis for my contention is that unlike all modern thinkers, the Taoists of ancient China took seriously an idea that all modern thinkers regard as preposterous. That idea is the idea that living things do not live in an uncaring world, in a world in which no higher power is at work in the lives of living things or the events of the natural world. "Nature" is not a morally insensate juggernaut that sometimes threatens the deserved well-being of innocent living things. A flood that profoundly affects the living inhabitants of a floodplain is not in any sense whatever a disaster or a catastrophe, and there is no sense in which human activity intended to control or prevent such events could possibly be considered wise or appropriate action. The reason for this fact is that — contrary to the assumptions of all modern interpreters, secular or religious — the contention of the Tao te ching is that the natural processes of the world are themselves guided and directed by a natural force that is not only utterly benign, but actually beneficent. Secondly, the Tao te ching argues clearly and repeatedly that that beneficent natural force is — despite our beliefs to the contrary — actually the most powerful force in the universe. Thirdly, the Tao te ching argues clearly and repeatedly that that natural force is — despite our beliefs to the contrary — continuously and ineluctably at work in all the processes and events of the world, whether we can perceive or appreciate it or not. "Returning to the Tao" in the Tao te ching means learning to see that force at work in the world and to rely upon it, rather than our own beliefs or actions, for the fulfillment of the health and harmony of all living things, human and otherwise.

### 2NC Environment Link

#### Attempts to fix the environment deny the very nature of the Tao—we must accept things for what they are.

Kirkland 98 [Russell Kirkland, Associate Professor of Religion (and Asian Studies), “"Responsible Non-Action" In a Natural World: Perspectives from the Nei-Yeh, Chuang-Tzu, and Tao-Te Ching,” 1998, University of Georgia, http://kirkland.myweb.uga.edu/rk/pdf/pubs/ECO.pdf]

Our modern problem is that we often have trouble assessing such teachings rationally. We tend so often to invest all such discussions with emotion, especially the idealized emotion of "compassion" or "sympathy," whereby we deny the validity of death or extinction of one or more living beings, and validate human efforts to prevent such events. Imbued as we are with the values born of Judaeo-Christian doctrines — values that teach us that we violate our God-given life if we let others die — modern people tend to equate "saving the whales" with due and appropriate concern for living things other than ourselves. As hard as it may be for us to believe, the teachings of the ancient Taoists would have us believe otherwise. Just as Heaven-and-Earth does not care whether a tornado, earthquake or hurricane destroy any millions of living things, so the Tao of the Tao te ching, Chuang-tzu and the Nei-yeh provides all things with an environment conducive to a natural span of life, and also with an environment that gives all things a natural death. To oppose that arrangement, and **rage against an environment** that provides us with a natural death as well as with a long and natural life, is to **deny the fundamental teachings of Taoism**, and to deny the very existence of the fundamental reality for Taoists of every description — the Tao itself. If we read the Taoist classics honestly, we see that the Tao provides for a full a natural life for all things, and also for their deaths. And we see that the proper attitude of a human who understands these things is and must be to **sit down, stop whining, and accept the natural reality** of which we are a part.

### AT: Race/Class Distorts Ability to Make Truth Claims

#### We cannot assume a priori that their authors have a unique insight on reality

Hammersley 93—Prof. Education and Social Research at Centre for Childhood, Development and Learning at Open U [Martyn, British Journal of Sociology, “Research and 'anti-racism': the case of Peter Foster and his critics,” 44.3, 11-93, JSTOR]

The second view I want to consider is sometimes associated with versions of the first, but must be kept separate because it involves a quite distinctive and incompatible element. I will refer to this as standpoint theory. Here people's experience and knowledge is treated as valid or invalid by dint of their membership in some social category.'7 Here again Foster's arguments may be dismissed because they reflect his background and experience as a white, middle class, male teacher. However, this time the implication is that reality is obscured from those with this background because of the effects of ideology. By contrast, it is suggested, the oppressed (black, female and/or working class people) have privileged insight into the nature of society. This argument produces a victory for one side, not the stalemate that seems to result from relativism the validity of Foster's views can therefore be dismissed. But in other respects this position is no more satisfactory than relativism. We must ask on what grounds we can decide that one group has superior insight into reality. This cannot be simply because they declare that they have this insight; otherwise **everyone could make the same claim with the same legitimacy** (we would be back to relativism). This means that some other form of ultimate justification is involved, but what could this be? In the Marxist version of this argument the working class (or, in practice, the Communist Party) are the group with privileged insight into the nature of social reality, but it is Marx and Marxist theorists who confer this privilege on them by means of a dubious philosophy of history.l8 Something similar occurs in the case of feminist standpoint theory, where the feminist theorist ascribes privileged insight to women, or to feminists engaged in the struggle for women’s emancipation. l9 However, while we must recognize that people in different social locations may have divergent perspectives, giving them distinctive insights, it is not clear why we should believe the implausible claim that some people have privileged access to knowledge while others are blinded by ideology.

### 2NC—AT: Must Learn About “x”

#### 2. Common framework is a prerequisite to meaningful debate.

Ehniger 70—Douglas Ehniger, Professor of Speech at University of Iowa, Speech Monographs [“Argument as Method: Its Nature, Its Limitation and Its Uses,” Volume 37, p. 108]

If two friends differ on whether they will gain grater satisfaction from dining at Restaurant A or Restaurant B, because the causes are simple and immediate, the common end at which they aim -- that of maximum enjoyment -- will exhibit like qualities. When, on the other hand, as in a dispute concerning political persuasions or social philosophies, the causes are broad and complex, the end aimed at may be remote or abstract. Always, however, some agreed upon end or goal must be present to define and delimit the evaluative ground within which the interchange is to proceed. When such round is lacking, argument itself, let alone any hope of resolution or agreement, becomes impossible. The absence of a commonly accepted aim or value is what lies at the root of many of the breakdowns that occur, for example, in negotiations between the Communist and Western nations, and what accounts for the well known futility of most disputes on matters of politics or religion. When disputants hold different values their claims pass without touching, just as they pass when different subjects are being discussed. What one party says simply is evaluatively irrelevant to the position of the other.

### 2NC—Fairness Outweighs Education

#### 1. Fairness is important—this is a competitive game and people have less incentive to start or stay in the game if it is unfair ---

#### a. Rules key to harness the educational value of competitive games like intellectual contests—this accesses the educational value of fun.

Prensky 1—Marc Prensky, Internationally acclaimed speaker, writer, consultant, and designer in the critical areas of education and learning, Founder, CEO and Creative Director of games2train.com, former vice president at the global financial firm Bankers Trust, BA from Oberlin College, an MBA from Harvard Business School with distinction and master's degrees from Middlebury and Yale [“Fun, Play and Games: What Makes Games Engaging,” Digital Game-Based Learning, www.marcprensky.com/writing/Prensky%20-%20Digital%20Game-Based%20Learning-Ch5.pdf]

So fun — in the sense of enjoyment and pleasure — puts us in a relaxed, receptive frame of mind for learning. Play, in addition to providing pleasure, increases our involvement, which also helps us learn. Both “fun” and “play” however, have the disadvantage of being somewhat abstract, unstructured, and hard-to-define concepts. But there exists a more formal and structured way to harness (and unleash) all the power of fun and play in the learning process — the powerful institution of games. Before we look specifically at how we can combine games with learning, let us examine games themselves in some detail. Like fun and play, game is a word of many meanings and implications. How can we define a game? Is there any useful distinction between fun, play and games? What makes games engaging? How do we design them? Games are a subset of both play and fun. In programming jargon they are a “child”, inheriting all the characteristics of the “parents.” They therefore carry both the good and the bad of both terms. Games, as we will see, also have some special qualities, which make them particularly appropriate and well suited for learning. So what is a game? Like play, game, has a wide variety of meanings, some positive, some negative. On the negative side there is mocking and jesting, illegal and shady activity such as a con game, as well as the “fun and games” that we saw earlier. As noted, these can be sources of resistance to Digital Game-Based Learning — “we are not playing games here.” But much of that is semantic. What we are interested in here are the meanings that revolve around the definition of games involving rules, contest, rivalry and struggle. What Makes a Game a Game? Six Structural Factors The Encyclopedia Britannica provides the following diagram of the relation between play and games: 35 PLAY spontaneous play organized play (GAMES) noncompetitive games competitive games (CONTESTS) intellectual contests physical contests (SPORTS) Our goal here is to understand why games engage us, drawing us in often in spite of ourselves. This powerful force stems first from the fact that they are a form of fun and play, and second from what I call the six key structural elements of games: 1. Rules 2. Goals and Objectives 3. Outcomes & Feedback 4. Conflict/Competition/Challenge/Opposition 5. Interaction, and 6. Representation or Story. There are thousands, perhaps millions of different games, but all contain most, if not all, these powerful factors. Those that don’t contain all the factors are still classified as games by many, but can also belong to other subclasses described below. In addition to these structural factors, there are also important design elements that add to engagement and distinguish a really good game from a poor or mediocre one. Let us discuss these six factors in detail and show how and why they lead to such strong engagement. Rules are what differentiate games from other kinds of play. Probably the most basic definition of a game is that it is organized play, that is to say rule-based. If you don’t have rules you have free play, not a game. Why are rules so important to games? Rules impose limits – they force us to take specific paths to reach goals and ensure that all players take the same paths. They put us inside the game world, by letting us know what is in and out of bounds. What spoils a game is not so much the cheater, who accepts the rules but doesn’t play by them (we can deal with him or her) but the nihilist, who denies them altogether. Rules make things both fair and exciting. When the Australians “bent” the rules of the America’s Cup and built a huge boat in 1988, and the Americans found a way to compete with a catamaran, it was still a race — but no longer the same game.

#### b. Fun is key to education and retention.

Prensky 1—Marc Prensky, Internationally acclaimed speaker, writer, consultant, and designer in the critical areas of education and learning, Founder, CEO and Creative Director of games2train.com, former vice president at the global financial firm Bankers Trust, BA from Oberlin College, an MBA from Harvard Business School with distinction and master's degrees from Middlebury and Yale [“Fun, Play and Games: What Makes Games Engaging,” Digital Game-Based Learning, www.marcprensky.com/writing/Prensky%20-%20Digital%20Game-Based%20Learning-Ch5.pdf]

So what is the relationship between fun and learning? Does having fun help or hurt? Let us look at what some researchers have to say on the subject: “Enjoyment and fun as part of the learning process are important when learning new tools since the learner is relaxed and motivated and therefore more willing to learn.”6 "The role that fun plays with regard to intrinsic motivation in education is twofold. First, intrinsic motivation promotes the **desire for recurrence of the experience**… Secondly, fun can motivate learners to engage themselves in activities with which they have little or no previous experience." 7 "In simple terms **a brain enjoying itself is functioning more efficiently**." 8 "**When we enjoy learning, we learn better**" 9 Fun has also been shown by Datillo & Kleiber, 1993; Hastie, 1994; Middleton, Littlefield & Lehrer, 1992, to increase motivation for learners. 10 It appears then that the principal roles of fun in the learning process are to create relaxation and motivation. Relaxation enables a learner to take things in more easily, and motivation enables them to put forth effort without resentment.

#### 2. Fairness is key to preserve the educational value of debate ---

#### a. Unpredictability causes shallow and generic debates—these are less valuable than strategies tailored to specific affirmatives.

#### b. Prevents rigorous testing—we need to research and isolate weaknesses and problems of the aff.

Zappen 4—James Zappen, Professor of Language and Literature at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute [“The Rebirth of Dialogue: Bakhtin, Socrates, and the Rhetorical Tradition,” p. 35-36]

Finally, Bakhtin describes the Socratic dialogue as a carnivalesque debate between opposing points of view, with a ritualistic crownings and decrownings of opponents. I call this Socratic form of debate a contesting of ideas to capture the double meaning of the Socratic debate as both a mutual testing of oneself and others and a contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives. Brickhouse and Smith explain that Socrates' testing of ideas and people is a mutual testing not only of others but also of himself: Socrates claims that he has been commanded by the god to examine himself as well as others; he claims that the unexamined life is not worth living; and, since he rarely submits to questioning himself, "it must be that in the process of examining others Socrates regards himself as examining his own life, too." Such a mutual testing of ideas provides the only claim to knowledge that Socrates can have: since neither he nor anyone else knows the real definitions of things, he cannot claim to have any knowledge of his own; since, however, he subjects his beliefs to repeated testing, he can claim to have that limited human knowledge supported by the "inductive evidence" of "previous elenctic examinations." This mutual testing of ideas and people is evident in the Laches and also appears in the Gorgias in Socrates' testing of his own belief that courage is inseparable from the other virtues and in his willingness to submit his belief and indeed his life to the ultimate test of divine judgment, in what Bakhtin calls a dialogue on the threshold. The contesting or challenging of others' ideas and their lives and their ritualistic crowning/decrowning is evident in the Gorgias in Soocrates' successive refutations and humiliations of Gorgias, Polus, and Callicles.

#### 3. We solve the terminal impact to education—fairness in a debate context through topicality fosters tolerance of alternative viewpoints which solves dogmatism and bigotry in society.

Muir 93—Star Muir, Professor of Communication at George Mason [“A Defense of the Ethics of Contemporary Debate,” *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 26.4, p. 291-292]

Firm moral commitment to a value system, however, along with a sense of moral identity, is founded in reflexive assessments of multiple perspectives. Switch-side debate is not simply a matter of speaking persuasively or organizing ideas clearly (although it does involve these), but of understanding and mobilizing arguments to make an effective case. Proponents of debating both sides observe that the debaters should prepare the best possible case they can, given the facts and information available to them.52 This process, at its core, involves critical assessment and evaluation of arguments; it is a process of critical thinking not available with many traditional teaching methods.53 We must progressively learn to recognize how often the concepts of others are discredited by the concepts we use to justify ourselves to ourselves. We must come to see how often our claims are compelling only when expressed in our own egocentric view. We can do this if we learn the art of using concepts without living in them. This is possible only when the intellectual act of stepping outside of our own systems of belief has become second nature, a routine and ordinary responsibility of everyday living. Neither academic schooling nor socialization has yet addressed this moral responsibility,54 but switch-side debating fosters this type of role playing and generates reasoned moral positions based in part on values of tolerance and fairness. Yes, there may be a dangerous sense of competitive pride that comes with successfully advocating a position against one's own views, and there are ex-debaters who excuse their deceptive practices by saying "I'm just doing my job." Ultimately, however, sound convictions are distinguishable from emphatic convictions by a consideration of all sides of a moral stance. Moral education is not a guaranteed formula for rectitude, but the central tendencies of switch-side debate are in line with convictions built on empathic appreciation for alternative points of view and a reasoned assessment of arguments both pro and con. Tolerance, as an alternative to dogmatism, is preferable, not because it invites a relativistic view of the world, but because in a framework of equal access to ideas and equal opportunities for expression, the truth that emerges is more defensible and more justifiable. Morality, an emerging focal point of controversy in late twentieth-century American culture, is fostered rather than hampered by empowering students to form their own moral identity.

#### 4. Empiricism is on our side—an experimental debate tournament with no topic caused students to perceive a lack of educational value—this discouraged them from participating in debate ---

#### a. The vast majority of students thought it was unfair.

Preston 3—Thomas Preston, Professor of communications at the University of Missouri-St. Louis [Summer 2003, “No-topic debating in Parliamentary Debate: Students and Critic Reactions,” http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf]

The study involved forty-three students and nine critics who participated in a parliamentary debate tournament where **no topic was assigned for the fourth round debates.** True to the idea of openness, **no rules regarding the topic were announced; no topic, or written instructions other than time limits and judging instruction**, were provided. In this spirit, the participants first provided anecdotal reactions to the no-topic debate, so that the data from this study could emerge from discussion. Second, respondents provided demographic data so that patterns could be compared along three dimensions. These dimensions, the independent variables for the student portion of the study, involved three items: 1) level of debate experience; 2) whether NPDA was the only format of parliamentary debate the students had experienced; and 3) **whether students had participated in NDT or CEDA policy debate**. Third, the questions were to determine how students rated the debates based on criteria for good debate-educational value, clash, and a fair division of ground. Students were also asked two general questions: whether they would try the no-topic debate again, and whether they liked the no-topic round. These questions constituted the dependent variables for the student study. Because the sample was small, descriptive statistical data were gathered from critics. Taking into account the experience of the critics, additional questions concerning items such as whether no-topic debating deepened discussion. Both students and critics were asked which side they thought the no-topic approach favored, and the students with NDT/ CEDA policy debating experience were asked if a no-topic debating season would be good for policy debate.For the objective items, critics and students were asked to circle a number between 1 and 7 to indicate the strength of reaction to each item (Appendix I and Appendix II). In scoring responses, the most favorable rating received the highest score of seven and the least favorable rating a score of one. In some instances, values that were circled on the sheet were reversed such that the most favorable reaction to that category received the higher score. Frequency distributions and statistics were then tabulated for each question, and the anecdotal remarks were tabulated. For the student empirical data, t-tests were conducted to determine whether overall debate experience, NPDA experience, or policy experience affected how the students reacted to an item. As a test for significance, p was set to less than or equal to .05. Finally, of the 43 responses, 35, **or 81**.4 **per cent, felt that the no-topic debate skewed the outcome of the debate toward one side or the other.** Of those responses, 32 **(91.4 per cent of those indicating a bias**, or 74.4 per cent of all respondents) **indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Government**. Three (8.6 per cent of those indicating a bias, or 7.0 per cent of all respondents) indicated that the no-topic debate gave an advantage to the Opposition.

#### b. The experiment empirically proves our argument—people do actually quit debate because of a lack of rules, causing the activity to degenerate into chaos.

Preston 3—Thomas Preston, Professor of communications at the University of Missouri-St. Louis [Summer 2003, “No-topic debating in Parliamentary Debate: Students and Critic Reactions,” http://cas.bethel.edu/dept/comm/npda/journal/vol9no5.pdf]

For the overall student data, each the mean of each item was slightly below 4.0, but mostly, the kurtosis **figures were negative**, and the standard deviations high, indicating a bipolar response to each question. The frequency tables bear out strong negative reactions, but a number of positive reactions which tended to be less strong. On the one hand, a substantial **number of students and** **critics felt very strongly that the experience was negative**, with the mode=l for each item on the survey; however, on others, a substantial number of respondents rated aspects of the experience at 4 and above. The educational value had the highest central tendencies (mean=3.65, median=4.0, and mode=1.0), whereas the question over whether the students liked **the experience was the lowest** (mean=3.19, median=3.0, mode=1.0). Although there was a weak positive pole to the responses, **those who had NDT/CEDA experience strongly opposed the idea of a no-topic year** of debating in those organizations (mean=2.77, median =1.00, mode=1.00). cont. **Reduced to absurdity, the notion of no rules for a debate tournament would result in chaos, bringing up an infinite regress** into whether or not chaos is a good thing! At least on the surface, the results of this particular study **would seem to discourage repeating this experiment as conducted for the present study**. A number of **participants may not want to return to the tournament because of the confusion and perceived lack of educational value**. However, an exact representation and t-tests between results could help not only assess the validity and reliability of the instrument, but whether attitudes and perceptions have changed toward no-topic debating. Therefore, whereas Option III may seem to be out of the questions, benefits can still be gained from it in terms of studying the evolution of parliamentary debate form.

### 2NC—AT: Predictability Bad/Static

#### 3. Clash key to education—

#### a. It’s critical to rigorous testing of ideas—that’s the only way to have knowledge and not assertions—that’s Zappen.

#### b. Testing ideas acts as a system of peer review preventing adoption of dangerous and unsupported claims—this ensures the value of research.

Murray et al., 1—David Murray et al, Director of the Statistical Assessment Service and Adjunct Professor at Georgetown, Joel Schwartz, Senior Adjunct Fellow at the Hudson Institute, and S. Robert Lichter, President of the Center for Media and Public Affairs [“It Ain’t Necessarily So: How Media Make and Unmake the Scientific Picture of Reality,” p. 148-149]

There is much truth to the claim that peer-reviewed research is legitimate research. As we will see, the presence or absence of peer review proves important for evaluating the quality of the research in all five of the cases that we introduced above. Why is peer review often thought to indicate if not guarantee reliability? In science as in law, the argument goes, people shouldn’t be judges in their own cases; it’s important for reasons to be assessed by someone who is both knowledgeable and impartial. Thus one danger is that researchers might knowingly deceive, falsify data to achieve a desired result; but scientific peer reviewers on the lookout for deception presumably deter a lot of it (just as cops walking the beat presumably deter crime). Human error on the part of researchers is far more common than outright deception, though. Researchers can make mistakes that render their conclusions worthless; and even when they conduct their research properly, they are also all too likely to exaggerate its importance. A review by scientists familiar with the subject matter is likely to detect mistakes and to qualify exaggerated claims. Thus peer review is important because it helps determine whether a study's substantive conclusion follows logically from the procedures used to arrive at it and whether the conclusion makes a significant contribution to our knowledge. Finally, science itself is the process through which scientists test one another's theories and evaluate and criticize one another's research. Science is supposed to be cumulative, to comprise a body of knowledge that is logically consistent, testable, and self-corrective. In that sense, peer review is more than a practice adopted by scientists. In a fundamental sense it is science, because only a researcher's peers will have the expertise needed to determine whether a research finding is scientific, in the sense that it adds to our knowledge and is consistent with what is already known. Science, then, consists of claims to knowledge that successfully with-stand criticisms from other scientists. Peer review is thought to provide an imprimatur of sorts because a scientist's claims are more likely to be valid if they've passed muster with competent scientific authorities. In science as in law, an unsupported assertion (or an assertion made by, say, a defendant in his own behalf) is rightly viewed more skeptically than an assertion buttressed by the support of eyewitnesses. In effect, peer reviewers, the judges of science, are also the witnesses who add credibility to the claims made by researchers.

### 2NC—AT: Spectator Phenomenon

#### 2. Turn—policy debate solves spectator phenomenon and increases education.

Joyner 99—Christopher C. Joyner, Professor of International Law in the Government Department at Georgetown University [Spring 1999, 5 ILSA J Int'l & Comp L 377, Lexis]

Use of the debate can be an effective pedagogical tool for education in the social sciences. Debates, like other role-playing simulations, help students understand different perspectives on a policy issue by adopting a perspective as their own. But, unlike other simulation games, debates do not require that a student participate directly in order to realize the benefit of the game. Instead of developing policy alternatives and experiencing the consequences of different choices in a traditional role-playing game, debates present the alternatives and consequences in a formal, rhetorical fashion before a judgmental audience. Having the class audience serve as jury helps each student develop a well-thought-out opinion on the issue by providing contrasting facts and views and enabling audience members to pose challenges to each debating team. These debates ask undergraduate students to examine the international legal implications of various United States foreign policy actions. Their chief tasks are to assess the aims of the policy in question, determine their relevance to United States national interests, ascertain what legal principles are involved, and conclude how the United States policy in question squares with relevant principles of international law. Debate questions are formulated as resolutions, along the lines of: "Resolved: The United States should deny most-favored-nation status to China on human rights grounds;" or "Resolved: The United States should resort to military force to ensure inspection of Iraq's possible nuclear, chemical and biological weapons facilities;" or "Resolved: The United States' invasion of Grenada in 1983 was a lawful use of force;" or "Resolved: The United States should kill Saddam Hussein." In addressing both sides of these legal propositions, the student debaters must consult the vast literature of international law, especially the nearly 100 professional law-school-sponsored international law journals now being published in the United States. This literature furnishes an incredibly rich body of legal analysis that often treats topics affecting United States foreign policy, as well as other more esoteric international legal subjects. Although most of these journals are accessible in good law schools, they are largely unknown to the political science community specializing in international relations, much less to the average undergraduate. By assessing the role of international law in United States foreign policy- making, students realize that United States actions do not always measure up to international legal expectations; that at times, international legal strictures get compromised for the sake of perceived national interests, and that concepts and principles of international law, like domestic law, can be interpreted and twisted in order to justify United States policy in various international circumstances. In this way, the debate format gives students the benefits/

ascribed to simulations and other action learning techniques, in that it makes them become actively engaged with their subjects, and not be mere passive consumers. Rather than spectators, students become legal advocates, observing, reacting to, and structuring political and legal perceptions to fit the merits of their case. The debate exercises carry several specific educational objectives. First, students on each team must work together to refine a cogent argument that compellingly asserts their legal position on a foreign policy issue confronting the United States. In this way, they gain greater insight into the real-world legal dilemmas faced by policy makers. Second, as they work with other members of their team, they realize the complexities of applying and implementing international law, and the difficulty of bridging the gaps between United States policy and international legal principles, either by reworking the former or creatively reinterpreting the latter. Finally, research for the debates forces students to become familiarized with contemporary issues on the United States foreign policy agenda and the role that international law plays in formulating and executing these policies. 8 The debate thus becomes an excellent vehicle for pushing students beyond stale arguments over principles into the real world of policy analysis, political critique, and legal defense. A debate exercise is particularly suited to an examination of United States foreign policy, which in political science courses is usually studied from a theoretical, often heavily realpolitik perspective. In such courses, international legal considerations are usually given short shrift, if discussed at all. As a result, students may come to believe that international law plays no role in United States foreign policy-making. In fact, serious consideration is usually paid by government officials to international law in the formulation of United States policy, albeit sometimes ex post facto as a justification for policy, rather than as a bona fide prior constraint on consideration of policy options. In addition, lawyers are prominent advisers at many levels of the foreign-policy-making process. Students should appreciate the relevance of international law for past and current US actions, such as the invasion of Grenada or the refusal of the United States to sign the law of the sea treaty and landmines convention, as well as for [\*387] hypothetical (though subject to public discussion) United States policy options such as hunting down and arresting war criminals in Bosnia, withdrawing from the United Nations, or assassinating Saddam Hussein.

### AT: Kappeler

#### The critique is disempowering—it cedes the political sphere.

Kath Gelber, Lecturer in Australian Politics and Human Rights at the University of New South Wales, 1995 (“The Will To Oversimplify,” *Green Left Weekly*, Issue 198, August 16, Available Online at http://www.greenleft.org.au/back/1995/198/198p26b.htm, Accessed 12-23-2004)

The Will to Violence presents a powerful and one-sided critique of the forces which enable violence between individuals to occur. Violence between individuals is taken in this context to mean all forms of violence, from personal experiences of assault to war.

Kappeler's thesis is that violence in all these cases is caused in the final instance by one overriding factor -- the individual choice to commit a violent act. Of course, in one sense that is true. Acknowledging alternative models of human behaviour and analyses of the social causes of violence, Kappeler dismisses these as outside her subject matter and exhorts her readers not to ignore the “agent's decision to act as he [sic] did”, but to explore “the personal decision in favour of violence”.

Having established this framework, she goes on to explore various aspects of personal decisions to commit violence. Ensuing chapters cover topics such as love of the “other”, psychotherapy, ego-philosophy and the legitimation of dominance.

However, it is the introduction which is most interesting. Already on the third page, Kappeler is dismissive of social or structural analyses of the multiple causes of alienation, violence and war. She dismisses such analyses for their inability to deal with the personal decision to commit violence.

For example, “some left groups have tried to explain men's sexual violence as the result of class oppression, while some Black theoreticians have explained the violence of Black men as a result of racist oppression”. She continues, “The ostensible aim of these arguments may be to draw attention to the pervasive and structural violence of classism and racism, yet they not only fail to combat such inequality, they actively contribute to it” [my emphasis].

Kappeler goes on to argue that, “although such oppression is a very real part of an agent's life context, these `explanations' ignore the fact that not everyone experiencing the same oppression uses violence”, i.e. the perpetrator has decided to violate.

Kappeler's aim of course was to establish a framework for her particular project: a focus on the individual and the psychological to “find” a cause for violence. However, her rejection of alternative analyses not only as of little use, but as actively contributing to the problem, frames her own thesis extremely narrowly. Her argument suffers from both her inability, or unwillingness, to discuss the bigger picture and a wilful distortion of what she sees as her opponents' views.

The result is less than satisfactory. Kappeler's book reads more as a passionate plea than a coherent argument. Her overwhelming focus on the individual, rather than providing a means with which to combat violence, in the end leaves the reader feeling disempowered. After all, there must be huge numbers of screwed up and vengeful people in the world to have chosen to litter history with war, environmental destruction and rape.

Where do we go from here? Those lucky enough to have read Kappeler's book are supposed to “decide not to use violence ourselves”. A worthy endeavour, but hardly sufficient to change the world.